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Introduction
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Danforth v. Minnesota1
represents a significant reaffirmation of the principle of judicial federalism that
underlies much of the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence.  The Court’s
decision to afford state courts leeway in determining the extent to which its
own decisions recognizing new rules of federal constitutional criminal
procedure or new applications of existing rules should apply in ongoing state
criminal prosecutions represents what may well be the final significant piece
of the federalism puzzle.  In so holding, the Court has essentially completed
the restructuring of the federalized system of criminal law and procedure
begun by the Warren Court activism of the 1960s.  Danforth is also important
because it provides a balance to the prevailing political orientation of the
United States Supreme Court, a balance struck with the ideological diversity
of state court judges.
The constitutional claim underlying the Court’s recognition of state
authority in the retroactive application of its decisions arose in the context of
a Confrontation Clause violation.  In Crawford v. Washington, the Court held
1. 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss3/1
2008] DANFORTH, RETROACTIVITY, AND FEDERALISM 427
that the admission at trial of a witness’s testimonial hearsay violates the right
of confrontation ensured by the Sixth Amendment  unless the witness is2
subject to cross examination at trial or is unavailable for trial but subject to a
prior, adequate opportunity for cross examination.   The Court’s focus on the3
“testimonial” character of the statement is critical because Crawford does not
impose a general prohibition on the admission of statements traditionally
admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule.  Only those statements made with
the reasonable expectation of their use in official proceedings, such as
depositions, affidavits, or statements made in response to questioning by
police, are within the ambit of the Crawford cross-examination requirement.4
Crawford overruled a quarter of a century of precedent in which the
traditional requirement for cross-examination had been supplanted by the
reliability test of Ohio v. Roberts.   Under Roberts, even statements of5
accomplices could be admitted provided they were found to demonstrate
“adequate indicia of reliability” sufficient to warrant admission even in the
absence of cross-examination.   Admission of statements through the reliability6
test was based on the idea that the hearsay exceptions and the Confrontation
Clause were designed to protect similar values, so when a statement fell within
a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the Confrontation Clause was met.   Since7
admission of accomplice statements was typically justified on the conclusion
that statements jointly incriminating the accomplice/declarant and the accused
were made against the declarant’s penal interest and thus qualified for
admissibility generally under Rule 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the Confrontation Clause was satisfied.8
Following Crawford’s significant reversal of the Court’s Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence, the next question to be addressed was whether the
decision should apply retroactively to those cases in which convictions rested
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
3. 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).  The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, “In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The Crawford Court emphasized that the
opportunity for cross-examination must be adequate.  541 U.S. at 57 (emphasis added).
4. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (“An accuser who makes a formal statement to government
officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance
does not.”)
5. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36.  
6. Id. at 66.
7. Id.
8. Id.; FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (“statement[s] which . . . at the time of [their] making . . .
so far tended to subject the declarant to . . . criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in the
declarant’s position would not have made the statement[s] unless believing [them] to be true”).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2008
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in whole or part on testimonial hearsay not subjected to cross-examination.  9
The Court, applying its retroactivity doctrine adopted in Teague v. Lane,10
rejected retroactive application of Crawford in Whorton v. Bockting.11
In Danforth, however, the Court explained that the application of Teague,
as a matter of federal due process, does not bar more expansive retroactive
application of federal decisions based on the application of state retroactivity
doctrines or principles in state post-conviction proceedings.   State courts may12
thus apply their own retroactivity doctrines or principles to afford state court
defendants the opportunity to rely on the Supreme Court’s rulings recognizing
new constitutional principles, application of existing principles in new
situations, or corrections of its own jurisprudential errors, as in Crawford.  It
is in this sense that the decision in Danforth represents something of a
watershed in the Court’s federalism jurisprudence, restoring to the states the
role of “little laboratories”  operating within the federal system for division13
of authority.
I. A Very Brief Overview of Judicial Federalism in the Context of Criminal
Process
Historically, the administration of most American criminal law has been
vested in the states, and the criminal process has been dominated by state
9. Historically, some decisions had been applied retroactively, particularly those most
likely to have implication for the outcome of the trial process.  For example, Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701-03 (1975), which prohibited explicit or implicit shifting of the
burden of proof to the accused to disprove an element of the offense, such as malice in the
commission of homicide, was applied retroactively in Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S.
233 (1977).
10. 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion).  The plurality’s reasoning in Teague was
applied by a majority of the Court in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
11. 549 U.S. 406 (2007).  According to the Whorton Court, “Under the Teague framework,
an old rule applies both on direct and collateral review, but a new rule is generally applicable
only to cases that are still on direct review.”  Id. at 416.
12. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1032-33 (2008).
13. States have sometimes been viewed as serving as “laboratories” for experimentation
in the development of policy implicating constitutional doctrine.  E.g., New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting ) (“To stay experimentation in
things social and economic is a grave responsibility.  Denial of the right to experiment may be
fraught with serious consequences to the Nation.  It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).  But see id. at
280 (holding “[t]he principle is imbedded in our constitutional system that there are certain
essentials of liberty with which the state is not entitled to dispense in the interest of
experiments.”).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss3/1
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criminal proceedings.   The general expansion of federal authority in response14
to the economic collapse of the Great Depression spilled over into criminal
law, which was reflected by more active congressional involvement in
legislative creation of federal crimes.  Nevertheless, the primary responsibility
for investigation and prosecution of traditional crimes—those without a
definite nexus to some federal regulatory activity  and not committed on15
federal property—has remained with the states.16
14. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (“[I]n areas such as criminal law
enforcement or education . . . States historically have been sovereign.”).
15. In Lopez, the Supreme Court held that Congress had failed to demonstrate the necessary
nexus between possession of a firearm on schoolgrounds and interstate commerce to warrant
criminalization under federal law.  Id. at 567.  The Court’s opinion is significant because it
suggests that any federal regulation based upon interstate commerce must involve an activity
directly or substantially affecting interstate commerce.  Id. at 556.  It is also arguable that the
5-4 decision reflects some concern with inadequate congressional fact-finding for the purpose
of demonstrating the existence of the interstate commerce nexus.  Id. at 562-63.  The majority
also observed that similar conduct was already the subject of state legislation.  Id. at 561 n.3.
XXSubsequently, in Jones v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the federal carjacking
statute that clearly addressed a potential Lopez-based challenge, where the statute provided:
“Whoever, possessing a firearm . . . takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped,
or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force
and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall . . . .”  Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 230 (1999) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. IV 1992) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2119 (2006)), but recognizing the statute had twice been amended before the case
came before the Court.).
XXLopez has spawned significant litigation regarding federalization of the criminal law.  For
instance, in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000), the Court rejected a federal
civil remedy created by a congressional effort to address the problem of violence against
women; the issue arose in a suit brought by a college student alleging she had been raped on a
college campus.  The Court rejected reliance on the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for federal jurisdiction, enforcing the distinction between
what is “truly” national and what is “truly” local.  Id. at 617-18, 627.  The suppression of
violent crime and regulation of non-economic, violent criminal conduct are matters for the
states, regardless of the aggregate impact on the national economy from violent crime.  Id. at
617-18.
XXSimilarly, in Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 850-51, 855 (2000), the Court held that
federal legislation aimed at arson did not properly regulate arson of a private residence under
the Commerce Clause despite the fact that the residence used natural gas transmitted through
interstate pipelines, and the issuance of an insurance policy on the structure suggested an impact
on commerce or economic activity.  In contrast, in Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858
(1985), the Court upheld the federal arson statute as applied to the attempted destruction of a
commercial property, which was an apartment building used as rental property.  In Russell, the
property’s use constituted an activity affecting commerce such that Congress was entitled to
regulate it.  Id. at 86.
16. Every so often, the overlapping criminalization of activity on both the federal and state
levels does, itself, prove to be a subject for litigation.  For instance, the recognition of the “dual
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2008
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For example, in Patterson v. New York, the Court unequivocally affirmed
the traditional role of state legislatures in defining criminal offenses and
recognizing affirmative defenses upon which the defendant may properly be
assigned the burden of proof.   Similarly, the interplay between federal17
constitutional values and state authority in the criminal process is seen
relatively early on in the Court’s direct involvement in incorporating
constitutional criminal procedural protections in state proceedings.  In
Michigan v. Long,  for instance, the Court observed:18
The state courts handle the vast bulk of all criminal litigation in
this country.  In 1982, more than 12 million criminal actions
(excluding juvenile and traffic charges) were filed in the 50 state
court systems and the District of Columbia. By comparison,
approximately 32,700 criminal suits were filed in federal courts
during that same year.  The state courts are required to apply
federal constitutional standards, and they necessarily create a
considerable body of “federal law” in the process.19
The relatively quickly accomplished “selective incorporation” process  which20
sovereignty” doctrine, permitting the same conduct to not only be subject to criminalization but
also to prosecution in both federal and state forums, is a response to the involvement of
Congress in criminal regulation.  The primary responsibility for criminal regulation previously
rested within the purview of state legislatures.  E.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 132
(1959) (trial in state court not barred by Fifth Amendment double jeopardy protection following
acquittal in federal prosecution on same charge); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959)
(subsequent trial on similar charge in federal court not barred by prior conviction for same
conduct in state court).  Arguably, the result in Bartkus could be different as a result of the
Court’s recognition of the applicability of the collateral estoppel doctrine in criminal cases,
based on its later decision in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).  There, the Court held that
an acquittal may bar a subsequent prosecution in the same court not otherwise barred by the
double jeopardy protection if the acquittal rested on full litigation of a fact essential to proof of
the charge in both prosecutions.  Id. at 445-46.
17. 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977).
18. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
19. Id. at 1043 n.8 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  For its statistical comparison, the
Court cited Victor E. Flango & Mary E. Elsner, Advance Report: The Latest State Court
Caseload Data, 7.1 ST. CT. J. 16, 18 (1983), and  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 6 (1982), available at http://www.
llmc-digital.org/docdisplay.aspx?textid=4651680.
20. As might be expected, significant judicial and scholarly comment has focused on the
doctrine of “selective incorporation.”  See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992); Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum on
“Incorporation” of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 746 (1965).
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included application of virtually every protection afforded by the Fourth,21
Fifth,  Sixth,  and Eighth Amendments  through the Fourteenth Amendment22 23 24
21. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule to require
suppression of physical evidence seized in violation of Fourth Amendment to state court
prosecutions).
22. E.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (applying protection against double
jeopardy to state proceedings); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (applying Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in state proceedings).
23. The important rights secured by the Sixth Amendment were made applicable to state
proceedings in a series of important Supreme Court cases.  E.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 150 (1968) (right to jury trial); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 221 (1967) (right
to speedy trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (right to compulsory process to
obtain testimony and develop a defense); Pointer v. Texas,  380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (right to
confrontation); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (right to assistance of counsel).
More recently, the Court found the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment,
applicable to state proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment, to require any fact that is
used for sentencing enhancement to be set out in the charging instrument.  Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000).  The right to trial only upon an indictment returned by a grand
jury was held not to apply to the states in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
24. In 1971, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the death penalty in McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), in which the central claim was that the capital sentencing
scheme unconstitutionally failed to impose limits on the sentencer’s discretion in setting
punishment at death.  Justice Harlan wrote the majority opinion in his last term on the Court. 
A year later, a plurality reversed the Court’s position, effectively voiding all existing state death
penalty statutes in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam), finding that the lack
of effective standards or criteria for capital sentencing resulted in an unconstitutional
application of the death penalty.
XXFor an explanation of the Court’s rather abrupt shift in perspective on the death penalty, see,
e.g., Malcolm L. Stewart, Justice Blackmun’s Capital Punishment Jurisprudence, 26 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 271, 276 (1998) (“Just over a year later, however, the Court abruptly shifted
course.”).  The explanation for the apparent shift in the Court’s position typically lies in the fact
that the claim raised in McGautha was predicated on Fourteenth Amendment due process
grounds, while Furman rested on the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition contained in the
Eighth Amendment.  See, e.g., Jonathan Bridges, Hooding the Jury, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 651, 674-
78 (2001); Robert Taylor Lemon II, Note, Constitutional Criminal Law¯The Role of Mitigating
Circumstances in Considering the Death Penalty, 53 TUL. L. REV. 608, 611 n.24 (1979).  This
analysis is supported by the Court’s own explanation in Gregg v. Georgia:
McGautha was not an Eighth Amendment decision, and to the extent it purported
to deal with Eighth Amendment concerns, it must be read in light of the opinions
in Furman v. Georgia.  There the Court ruled that death sentences imposed under
statutes that left juries with untrammeled discretion to impose or withhold the
death penalty violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  While Furman
did not overrule McGautha, it is clearly in substantial tension with a broad reading
of McGautha’s holding. . . . [W]e adhere to Furman’s determination that where
the ultimate punishment of death is at issue a system of standardless jury
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2008
432 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  61:425
Due Process Clause to defendants in state court litigation was concluded by the
mid-1970s with the exception of the Court’s continuing involvement in
reviewing state death penalty cases.25
In their respective separate opinions in Adamson v. California, Justices
Frankfurter and Black argued over whether the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause “incorporated” the protections afforded by the Bill of Rights
into state proceedings.   The majority held that the Fifth Amendment26
protection against self-incrimination did not apply in a California capital
murder prosecution because the jurisdiction did not prohibit comment on a
defendant’s decision not to testify or present evidence on his behalf.   Justice27
Frankfurter, concurring, agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require
application of the protections of the first eight amendments to state
prosecutions whatsoever.   Justice Black dissented, arguing that total28
incorporation of these protections was clearly implicated by the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment.   Adamson was overruled in Malloy v. Hogan.  29 30
“Selective incorporation” represents a compromise over the extent to which
the Fourteenth Amendment bears on specific protections ultimately deemed
applicable to state proceedings.  Justice Black offered an explanation of the
concept in his concurring opinion in Duncan v. Louisiana:31
The Court today holds that the right to trial by jury guaranteed
defendants in criminal cases in federal courts by Art. III of the
United States Constitution and by the Sixth Amendment is also
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to defendants tried in
discretion violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
428 U.S. 153, 196 n.47 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
25. The Court remains active in construing the protections afforded by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments in state capital prosecutions.  See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S.
374, 390-93 (2005) (holding trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to examine
file on defendant’s prior conviction admitted at capital sentencing hearing); Bradshaw v.
Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 187-88 (2005) (remanding for reconsideration of propriety of death
sentence where prosecutor used inconsistent theories in pursuing death penalty against co-
defendants); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 265-66 (2005) (holding prosecutor’s exercise
of peremptory challenges in capital prosecution demonstrated racial discriminatory intent,
despite contrary findings of state and lower federal courts); Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622,
632-34 (2005) (holding shackling of defendant during capital sentencing hearing improper);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding execution of defendant under the age of
eighteen at the time of offense prohibited by Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).  
26. 332 U.S. 46, 59-92 (1947), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
27. Id. at 54-55.
28. Id. at 63-65 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 70-72 (Black, J., dissenting).
30. 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
31. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss3/1
2008] DANFORTH, RETROACTIVITY, AND FEDERALISM 433
state courts.  With this holding I agree for reasons given by the
Court.  I also agree because of reasons given in my dissent in
Adamson v. California.  In that dissent, at 90, I took the position,
contrary to the holding in Twining v. New Jersey, that the
Fourteenth Amendment made all of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights applicable to the States.32
Continuing, he explained that he supported the concept of “selective
incorporation,” in which only those constitutional protections implicating the
notion of ordered liberty justify application of specific constitutional
protections to state process,  as opposed to the rejection of any incorporation33
that had been the Court’s position in Twining.   Justice Black, joined by34
Justice Douglas in his concurrence, then concluded:
In closing I want to emphasize that I believe as strongly as ever
that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to make the Bill of
Rights applicable to the States.  I have been willing to support the
selective incorporation doctrine, however, as an alternative,
although perhaps less historically supportable than complete
incorporation.  The selective incorporation process, if used
properly, does limit the Supreme Court in the Fourteenth
Amendment field to specific Bill of Rights’ protections only and
keeps judges from roaming at will in their own notions of what
policies outside the Bill of Rights are desirable and what are not.
And, most importantly for me, the selective incorporation process
has the virtue of having already worked to make most of the Bill of
Rights’ protections applicable to the States.35
In opposition, Justice Harlan criticized the Court’s incorporation of express
constitutional protections in the Bill of Rights to state proceedings in his
concurring opinion in Griffin v. California, describing the practice as a
32. Id. at 162-63 (Black, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
33. The majority in Duncan relied on the traditional formula for assessing incorporation,
whether claimed rights subject to incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment constitute
“fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions,” whether it is deemed “basic [of] our system of jurisprudence,” or whether it is a
“fundamental right, essential to a fair trial.”  Id. at 148-49.
34. Id. (referencing Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 98-99 (1908), where the Court
had rejected the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the protection afforded
by the first eight amendments in restraining state action). 
35. Id. at 171 (Black, J., concurring).
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“creeping paralysis with which this Court’s recent adoption of the
‘incorporation’ doctrine is infecting the operation of the federal system.”36
The Court’s incorporation “revolution” raised a new generation of lawyers
versed in the realities of Supreme Court intervention in state process.  When
a more conservative Court took hold with the appointment of Justices
advocating judicial restraint, those Justices’ influence restricted involvement
in work traditionally assigned to the states.  This restriction came in the form
of limitations on the expansion of constitutional protections, retrenchment,37
and increasing deference to the concerns of federalism.  
Michigan v. Long remains extremely important in the federalism equation
fashioned by the Supreme Court because there the Court drew the line on the
state court development of federal constitutional doctrine, reserving for itself
the authority to interpret and apply the protections afforded by the
Constitution.   In Oregon v. Hass, the Court disavowed the notion that state38
courts might properly interpret the Federal Constitution to provide greater
protection to state court defendants than the Court itself had recognized.   In39
Hass, the Court rejected the Oregon Supreme Court’s statement that it could
“interpret the Fourth Amendment more restrictively than interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court,” holding that this was “not the law and surely
must be an inadvertent error.”   The Hass Court further explained that, while 40
a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater
restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be
necessary upon federal constitutional standards . . . [it] may not
impose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional
law when this Court specifically refrains from imposing them.41
36. 380 U.S. 609, 616 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).  For another conservative view on
the incorporation debate, see Justice Frankfurter’s opinion for the majority in Bartkus v. Illinois,
359 U.S. 121, 121-39 (1959).
37. E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468
U.S. 981, 990-91 (1984).  Both cases recognized a “good faith” exception to the warrant
requirement where the warrant was defective due to a clerical or other error made inadvertently. 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 905; Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 990-91.
38. 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) (“[W]hen, as in this case, a state court decision fairly
appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the
adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the
opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case
the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.”).
39. 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).
40. Id. at 719 n.4 (quoting State v. Florance, 527 P.2d 1202, 1208 (Or. 1974)).
41. Id. at 719 (citations omitted).
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Many lawyers and state judges educated during the period of the Court’s
activism in the criminal procedure arena engaged in a flanking action in
response to the Court’s conservative “counter-revolution.”  They actively
developed alternative theories based on state constitutional provisions, rather
than advancing federal constitutional claims subject to review by the Supreme
Court on certiorari.   The state constitutional law approach to litigating42
constitutional issues in the face of adverse precedent from the United States
Supreme Court was promoted by Justice Brennan.43
The development of state constitutional theory as an alternative to reliance
on federal constitutional protections has been apparent in the jurisprudence of
many individual state courts and related academic literature.  For example, the
Arkansas Supreme Court recognized the rights of consenting adults to engage
in homosexual relations in striking down the state’s sodomy law in Jegley v.
Picado,  prior to the United States Supreme Court’s same result in Lawrence44
v. Texas.45
In Rikard v. State, the Arkansas Supreme Court summarized its
development of state constitutional doctrine diverging from federal
constitutional protection.   In reviewing a challenge to a search urged pursuant46
to article 2, section 15 of the Arkansas Constitution,  it observed: 47
This court has recently imposed greater restrictions on police
activities than the United States Constitution in three cases based
on our own state law.  Despite doing so, this court noted in
Sullivan, that “there are occasions and contexts in which federal
Fourth Amendment interpretation provides adequate protections
against unreasonable law enforcement conduct; however, there are
also occasions when this court will provide more protection under
the Arkansas Constitution than that provided by the federal courts.” 
Furthermore, we observed in Sullivan that one “pivotal inquiry” is
42. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 500-01 (1977) (noting that determinations relying on state constitutional
law are beyond the reach of federal review).  The practical approach to using these alternative
sources of law is examined in Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitler, Presenting a State
Constitutional Argument: Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. REV. 635 (1987).  See
also Long, 463 U.S. at 1041 (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by
us in interpreting their state constitutions.” (quoting Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551,
557 (1940)).
43. Brennan, supra note 42, at 502.
44. 80 S.W.3d 332, 334 (Ark. 2002).
45. 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
46. 123 S.W.3d 114 (Ark. 2003).
47. ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 15.
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“whether this court has traditionally viewed an issue differently
than the federal courts.”48
Similarly, the Montana Supreme Court recently held in State v. Goetz  that49
the privacy guarantee contained in the state constitution  prohibits the50
recording of conversations between a suspect and undercover drug agent or
informant without a warrant.   The court held that the state constitution51
provided broader protection for personal privacy than that recognized under
the United States Constitution.52
Last term, in another important decision having federalism consequences,
Virginia v. Moore, the United States Supreme Court reinforced the autonomy
of state courts to develop state law alternative theories for disposition of claims
raising federal constitutional protection analogs.   In Moore, the Court held53
that where state actors violate privacy rights protected under state
constitutional provisions or statutes, but not by the Fourth Amendment, the
state court is not bound to suppress the improperly seized evidence.   Thus,54
while violations of Fourth Amendment rights require suppression of evidence
under Mapp,  the prophylactic rule designed to prevent constitutional55
violations in the investigation process does not necessarily apply to violations
48. Rickard, 123 S.W.3d at 118-19 (citations omitted).  These developments also prompted
scholarly comment, including an article by Justice Brown, author of the opinions in Jegley v.
Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002), one of the three cases imposing greater restrictions on
police activities in Arkansas than the United States Constitution, and Rickard, 123 S.W.3d 114. 
Robert L. Brown, Expanded Rights Through State Law: The United States Supreme Court
Shows State Courts the Way, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 499 (2002); see also Robert F.
Williams, The New Judicial Federalism Takes Root in Arkansas, 58 ARK. L. REV. 883 (2006)
(examining the development of Arkansas constitutional law).
49. 191 P.3d 489 (Mont. 2008).
50. MONT. CONST. art II, § 10.  This section provides, in pertinent part: “The right of
individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed
without the showing of a compelling state interest.”  Id.  No comparable language purporting
to protect individual privacy interests appears in the United States Constitution.
51. Goetz, 191 P.3d at 504.
52. Id. at 494, 496 (implicitly rejecting United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752-53
(1971) (plurality opinion)).  Goetz held that the Fourth Amendment did not require that
surreptitious recording of a conversation with a suspect be conducted pursuant to a warrant
because the person engaged in the conversation “assumes the risk” that the other person may
disclose the contents of the conversation.  Id.  The Montana court noted that the West Virginia
Supreme Court in State v. Mullens, 650 S.E.2d 169, 190 (W. Va. 2007), had also rejected White,
applying state constitutional law grounds in a similar context.  Id. at 508 (Morris, J., concurring
and dissenting).
53. 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1606-07 (2008).
54. Id. at 1606.
55. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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for acts contrary only to state law.   The decision recognizes greater autonomy56
in the enforcement of state law, affording state courts the option of adopting
suppression of illegally or impermissibly seized evidence as a remedy, but not
to the exclusion of alternate remedies.57
II. Retroactivity Doctrine as Applied to New Rules Under the Federal
Constitution
One of the critical questions addressed in the incorporation process involved
the determination of exactly when a rule or application of a criminal
procedural protection recognized by the Court under the Federal Constitution
would apply to state court litigation.  The Court established the controlling
principle of retroactivity in Linkletter v. Walker  and Stovall v. Denno  during58 59
the Court’s most expansive period of selective incorporation of federal
constitutional protections to state proceedings.  There, the Court concluded
that whether a holding should be applied retroactively should be determined
by a three-part test: “(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the
extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and
(c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the
new standards.”   60
This approach afforded flexibility in the retroactivity determination, but at
some cost to certainty and, often, to fairness in the application of new
constitutional doctrine. This concern for certainty and fairness prompted
Justice Harlan to criticize the flexible approach to retroactivity taken in
Linkletter.61
The Court essentially provided a definitive response to the criticism that
Linkletter’s flexible approach led to uncertainty in two decisions, Griffith v.
Kentucky  and Teague v. Lane.   In Griffith, the Court held that all new rules62 63
announced by the Court would apply to benefit those state and federal litigants
having preserved their similar claims in litigation not final and still pending at
the time the new rule is announced.  64
56. Moore, 128 S. Ct. at 1606.
57. Id.
58. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
59. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
60. Id. at 297.
61. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675-702 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-58 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
62. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
63. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
64. 479 U.S. at 322-23.  Griffith’s retroactivity principle extends application of new rules
to those cases remaining in the direct appeal process and not final at the time the rule is
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In contrast to the defendant-friendly rule of retroactivity for cases pending
when the “new” rule of constitutional criminal procedure is announced, a far
less favorable rule applies to retroactive application of those “new” rule
decisions for individuals whose cases have concluded on direct appeal.  In
Teague v. Lane, the Court held that “new” rules—those that break with
established precedent —are not applied retroactively for the benefit of65
defendants whose cases have been finalized through the direct appeal process
at the time the “new” rule is announced.   Under Teague, rules dictated by66
precedent are not “new” and, thus, not subject to its restrictive retroactivity
doctrine.67
Addressing Justice Harlan’s criticism, Justice O’Connor observed for the
plurality in Teague: 
[W]e believe that Justice Harlan’s concerns about the difficulty in
identifying both the existence and the value of accuracy-enhancing
procedural rules can be addressed by limiting the scope of the
second exception to those new procedures without which the
likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.
Because we operate from the premise that such procedures
would be so central to an accurate determination of innocence or
guilt, we believe it unlikely that many such components of basic
due process have yet to emerge.68
Teague supplanted Linkletter’s flexibility with a fixed principle subject to
only limited exceptions.   In a sense, Teague complemented Griffith in69
providing the necessary corollary to Griffith’s bright line for retroactive
application of new rules to benefit all litigants presenting preserved claims in
the direct appeal process.  But these fixed rules can result in an essentially
unfair result for a litigant whose case was tried under a rule subsequently
discarded and who would be denied the benefit of a new rule recognizing the
correctness of the supplanted rule because of the non-retroactive policy
adopted in Teague.
In Teague, the Court recognized two exceptions to the presumptive non-
retroactivity principle governing announcement of new rules of constitutional
announced and includes the pendency of a petition for certiorari or time for filing for review by
certiorari.  Id. at 32l n.6.
65. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (“[A] case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated
by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”).  
66. Id. at 310.
67. Id. at 301.
68. Id. at 313.
69. See generally Teague, 489 U.S. 288.
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criminal procedure.   The first accords retroactive application to new rules70
that restrict the authority of the government to proscribe particular types of
conduct or impose specific forms of punishment against defendants based on
their status or the nature of the offense.   For instance, the Court’s rulings that71
certain mentally retarded individuals  and juveniles under the age of eighteen72
at the time of the offense  cannot be executed consistent with the Eighth73
Amendment fit this exception and require retroactive application.74
The second exception provides for retroactive application of new rules that
are said to be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”   The Court75
explained that the class of rules fitting within this exception are those which
ensure fundamental fairness and accuracy in the fact-finding process.   The76
Teague Court recognized the possibility that a newly-articulated rule of
constitutional criminal procedure could be deemed so fundamental to the
accuracy of fact-finding in the trial process that it would represent a
“watershed” rule of criminal process.  77
Not only did the Court in Teague draw a line in determining retroactive
application of its holdings based on whether a rule applied in a decision was
“new” or one dictated by existing precedent, but it also reserved the
development of constitutional criminal procedural rules for itself, rather than
permitting lower federal courts to articulate new rules or applications in the
federal habeas process.   Constitutional claims requiring recognition of “new”78
rules by federal habeas courts do not warrant relief in the federal habeas
process.  The federal habeas statute now reflects the Court’s approach.   79 80
70. Id. at 311.
71. Id.; e.g., Penry  v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
72. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
73. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
74. These new rules may restrict the ability of the state to impose punishment, particularly
the death penalty, based on the individual attributes of the convicted capital defendant, such as
his mental impairment or his status as a juvenile.
75. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).  
76. Id. at 312-13.
77. See Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990).  A “watershed” rule is a rule that
“implicat[es] the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”  Id.
78. Teague, 489 U.S. at 316.
79. This principle is now incorporated by statute in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006), which
provides in pertinent part:
XX(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim—
XX(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
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The “new” rules doctrine also precludes federal circuit and district courts
from applying existing rules to novel situations.  For example, in Caspari v.
Bohlen,  the Court held that the Eighth Circuit had violated this principle in81
analogizing from the Court’s decision in Bullington v. Missouri  that a82
failure of proof in a non-capital sentencing proceeding would bar imposition
of a greater sentence in a remanded resentencing proceeding.   83
An interesting question left unanswered by Teague was whether due process
rationale dictates that Teague’s retroactivity policy apply to state courts.  The
importance of this issue was suggested by the development of state
constitutional law as an alternative to disposition of criminal procedure claims
on federal constitutional grounds.  The issue that arises is whether state courts
have the authority to apply broader retroactivity doctrines or principles to
United States Supreme Court decisions announcing “new” rules or new
applications of existing precedent when the Court itself declines to apply these
holdings retroactively.  This issue was recently raised and decided in Danforth
v. Minnesota.   The Danforth majority  concluded that state courts are not84 85
barred by federal constitutional restrictions from affording greater protection
to state defendants than required by the federal due process guarantee in
applying Supreme Court decisions announcing “new rules” of constitutional
criminal procedure retroactively.   Thus, individual jurisdictions are afforded86
discretion to permit state court defendants whose cases are final at the time the
Court announces a “new rule” to rely on the “new rule” in petitioning for relief
in state postconviction proceedings.  
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States . . . . 
Id. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added).
80. See, e.g., Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 120-21 (1995) (noting that federal habeas
courts cannot announce new rules of existing rules of constitutional criminal procedure and
following Teague).
81. 510 U.S. 383 (1994).
82. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).  
83. Caspari, 510 U.S. at 396-97.  Subsequently, in Monge v. California, the Court rejected
the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in Caspari and held that the double jeopardy protections afforded
by the Fifth Amendment do not bar an increase in a non-capital sentence on remand following
a failure of proof in the original sentencing proceeding.  Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 734
(1998).
84. 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008).
85. The Danforth majority opinion was written by Justice Stevens.  Six members of the
Court joined this opinion, with the Chief Justice, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissenting.  Id. at
1032.
86. Id. at 1041-42.
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III. Danforth in Context
The substantive claim involved in Danforth was based on Crawford v.
Washington,  in which the Supreme Court reexamined the role of cross-87
examination in Confrontation Clause  analysis.  There, it restored the primacy88
of cross-examination as a necessary element of confrontation when the State
offers into evidence the custodial statement of a witness who has not been
subjected to meaningful cross-examination by the accused’s counsel in a
criminal proceeding.89
A. Confrontation Precedent and Danforth’s Claim
The procedural context in which Danforth arose requires some
consideration of the progression of confrontation jurisprudence from Crawford
through Whorton v. Bockting,  in which the Court addressed the question of90
retroactive application of Crawford.  Importantly, Crawford arose in the
context of direct appeal, thus avoiding the limiting rules of Teague that would
have likely frustrated consideration of the claim had it been litigated in the
federal habeas process.91
1. Revisiting Confrontation in Crawford
With regard to retroactivity, the Court’s decision in Crawford poses a novel
scenario in its post-Teague jurisprudence because instead of simply
announcing a “new” rule not previously in place, it revived a traditional rule
that had been subverted in a line of decisions reaching over a little less than
twenty-five years.   In deciding the case, Justice Scalia, writing for the92
majority, candidly admitted: “[W]e view this as one of those rare cases in
which the result below is so improbable that it reveals a fundamental failure
on our part to interpret the Constitution in a way that secures its intended
constraint on judicial discretion.”93
87. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
88. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him . . . .”  Id.
89. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
90. 549 U.S. 406 (2007). 
91. Under the Teague “new rules” doctrine, new rules of constitutional criminal procedure
cannot be recognized by lower federal courts in the habeas corpus process.  See Caspari v.
Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1994).
92. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69, issued in 2004, overruled the rationale adopted by the
Court in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, decided in 1980. 
93. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added).
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Michael Crawford was convicted of assaulting an individual that he claimed
had tried to rape his wife, Sylvia.   Both the defendant and his wife gave94
statements to the police, but the statements diverged on a critical point. 
Crawford claimed that he had killed the victim in self-defense because he
believed the victim had picked up a weapon during a confrontation over his
alleged sexual assault of Sylvia.   Sylvia, however, told police that she had not95
seen the victim with a weapon during the fight, as her husband claimed.   At96
trial, the prosecution offered Sylvia’s statement to rebut her husband’s claim
of self-defense,  and Crawford was convicted.   The conviction was affirmed97 98
by the Washington Supreme Court, which rejected the reasoning of the state
court of appeals in ordering a reversal based on violation of Crawford’s
confrontation rights.99
The Washington Supreme Court followed Ohio v. Roberts in concluding
that the statement was admissible as a declaration against Sylvia’s penal
interest,  bearing sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant admission despite100
the fact that she could not be compelled to testify for purposes of cross-
examination.   However, the state court rejected the argument that Michael101
Crawford waived his confrontation rights when he invoked the marital
privilege to prevent Sylvia from being compelled to testify against him at
trial.102
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court majority in Crawford
overruled Roberts, functionally reinstating the rule of Douglas v. Alabama103
that excluded accomplice statements in the absence of a meaningful
opportunity for the accused to test a statement by cross-examination.104
94. Id. at 38-40.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 39-40.
97. Id. at 40-41.
98. Id. at 41.
99. State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 664 (Wash. 2002), rev’g, No. 25307-1-II, 2001 WL
850119 (Wash. Ct. App. July 30, 2001), rev’d, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  The court of appeals had
rejected the claim that Sylvia’s statement was reliable because it was against her penal interest
and, thus, admissible against Michael because of its presumptive reliability.  Crawford, 2001
WL 850119, at *6-7.  Consequently, the court held that the admission of her statement did not
satisfy constitutional standards for confrontation.  Id.
100. Crawford, 54 P.3d at 662-63 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)).  Washington
recognizes declarations against penal interest as an exception to the hearsay rule.  WASH. R.
EVID. 804(b)(3).
101. Crawford, 54 P.3d at 662-64.
102. Id. at 659-60.
103. 380 U.S. 415, 418-20 (1965).  
104. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57.  In re-affirming the accused’s right to confrontation by cross-
examination, the majority traced the history of the right to Sir Walter Raleigh’s case in 1603. 
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Consistent with Griffith,  of course, Crawford applied to all cases still105
pending in state appellate courts or on certiorari to the Supreme Court in which
the issue of admission of testimonial hearsay had been decided adversely based
on pre-Crawford holdings of the Court.   But the Court did not indicate106
whether its decision would apply retroactively to cases already concluded in
the direct appeal process prior to the date of its announcement of Crawford.107
2. Resolution of the Retroactivity Claim in Whorton v. Bockting
Bockting, convicted in a Nevada prosecution for sexual assault of a child
under the age of fourteen years,  challenged his conviction based on the108
admission of an out-of-court statement made by the complainant.   The state109
supreme court dismissed the appeal in a table decision.   Bockting110
successfully petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari
following dismissal of his appeal in the Nevada Supreme Court.   The U.S.111
Supreme Court vacated and remanded his case for reconsideration in light of
Idaho v. Wright, in which it had held that admission of certain statements
made by children relating to sexual abuse violated the Confrontation Clause
where the statements were made in response to questioning and offered under
an exception to the hearsay rule.   On remand, the Nevada Supreme Court,112
relying on Ohio v. Roberts, found no violation under Wright and affirmed
Bockting’s conviction.  113
Following Crawford, Bockting again attacked his conviction, this time in
a federal habeas action that initially resulted in a denial of relief.   However,114
he found receptive judges in the Ninth Circuit, although the two members of
the panel who voted to apply Crawford retroactively to afford him relief
Id. at 43-62 (citing Raleigh’s Case, (1603) 2 How. St. Tr. 1, 15-16, 24 (K.B.) (Eng.)).  Justice
White, writing for the majority in California v. Green, also traced the historical roots of cross-
examination to the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.  California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 n.10
(1970) (citing Raleigh’s Case, (1603) 2 How. St. Tr. 1, 15-16, 24 (K.B.) (Eng.)).
105. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1987); see supra notes 62, 64.
106. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
107. See generally id.
108. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 412 (2007); see also Bockting v. State,  847 P.2d
1364, 1364 (Nev. 1993) (per curiam).
109. Bockting v. State, 810 P.2d 317 (Nev. 1989) (unpublished table decision), vacated, 497
U.S. 1021 (1990) (mem.).  
110. Id.
111. Bockting v. Nevada, 497 U.S. 1021, 1021 (1990) (mem.).  
112. Id.; Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 812-27 (1990).
113. Bockting v. State, 847 P.2d 1364, 1368-70 (Nev. 1993) (per curiam) (citing Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)). 
114. Bockting v. Bayer, No. CV-N-98-0764-ECR (VPC), 2002 WL 34184485 (D. Nev. Mar.
19, 2002); see also Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 413 (2007).
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disagreed on the proper rationale.   Judge McKeown and Judge Wallace both115
concluded that, in fact, Crawford did announce a new rule of constitutional
criminal procedure.   Judge McKeown found that the decision had116
recognized a watershed rule warranting retroactive application because it
“rework[ed] our understanding of bedrock criminal procedure” and thus fell
under Teague’s second exception to non-retroactivity.   Judge Wallace117
agreed that Crawford announced a new rule, but disagreed that it required
retroactive application under Teague’s second exception.  118
Judge Noonan concluded that Crawford did not announce a new rule,
instead finding that the Court had restored prior precedent in overruling Ohio
v. Roberts.   Thus, Crawford was dictated by precedent, rather than119
announcing a “new rule” governed by the Teague retroactivity doctrine.  120
Judge Noonan explained:  “A change in rationale is not treated by the Supreme
Court as a change in rules.  All along, the bedrock was there.”   Judge121
Noonan, however, wrote only for himself, otherwise concurring in Judge
McKeown’s analysis.   Like Judge Wallace, Judge Noonan argued that122
Crawford’s potential for retroactive application had already been foreclosed
by the Court in Schriro v. Summerlin,  in which it had refused to apply Ring123
v. Arizona  retroactively, while observing that it had yet to find any new rule124
that fit within Teague’s second exception based on the watershed character of
the rule articulated.125
The argument over retroactive application of Crawford was highlighted by
rare support within the federal circuits for the proposition that the rule revived
in Crawford—requiring cross-examination for admission of testimonial
hearsay—would fit within Teague’s second exception to the retroactivity bar
for cases final at the time the Court announced its decision in Crawford.  Judge
Clay of the Sixth Circuit,  and Judge DeMoss of the Fifth,  as well as Judge126 127
115. Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005), amended and reh’g denied by 408
F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2005), and reh’g denied en banc, 418 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub
nom. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 406 (2007).
116. Id. at 1014-16, 1024.
117. Id. at 1016.
118. Id. at 1024, 1028-29 (Wallace, J., concurring and dissenting).
119. Id. at 1022-24 (Noonan, J., concurring).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1024 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004)).
122. Id. at 1022-24.
123. 542 U.S. 348 (2004).
124. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
125. Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d at 1023-24 (Noonan, J., concurring); id. at 1029 (Wallace,
J., concurring and dissenting).
126. Fulcher v. Motley, 444 F.3d 791, 811 (6th Cir. 2006) (Clay, J., concurring).  The panel
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McKeown of the Ninth,  all issued separate opinions accepting the argument128
that Crawford not only had announced a new rule, but one of a watershed
character that warranted retroactive application.  Judge DeMoss concluded,
“Without confrontation in such cases, ‘the likelihood of an accurate conviction
is seriously diminished.’”   Judge McKeown similarly observed: “the129
Crawford rule is one without which the likelihood of accurate conviction is
seriously diminished.”130
But such “watershed” rules appear to actually exist only hypothetically in
the Court’s jurisprudence.  Following the en banc rejection of a rehearing on
the Bockting panel’s holding affording him habeas relief,  the Supreme Court131
granted certiorari and unanimously reversed.   Apparently unimpressed by132
the views of lower court judges that Crawford represented a bedrock
protection for criminal defendants, the Court concluded that the cross-
examination requirement did threaten “an impermissibly large risk of an
inaccurate conviction” sufficient to meet the reliability test of Ohio v.
Roberts.   133
On this point, the Court’s analysis is flawed in the sense that Crawford
directly addressed a subset of statements that the Court itself had consistently
characterized as “suspect” statements made by accomplices.   But the134
statement admitted in Ohio v. Roberts was not an unsworn, uncrossed
testimonial statement made to the police.   Instead, it was sworn preliminary135
hearing testimony subjected to cross-examination.   The potential for136
inaccurate convictions based on admission of untested accomplice statements
should be viewed in light of the Court’s own view of these statements as
inherently suspect.  To the extent that convictions have been obtained on the
applied pre-Crawford confrontation law to grant relief.  Id. at 811 (noting that a prior panel had
rejected the Crawford retroactivity argument in Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir.
2005)).
127. Lave v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2006) (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
128. Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d at 1016-21.
129. Lave, 444 F.3d at 337 (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (citing Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S.
348, 352 (2004)).
130. Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d at 1021.
131. Bockting v. Bayer, 418 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2005) (denying motion for rehearing en
banc), rev’d sub. nom Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007).
132. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. at 408, 421.
133. Id. at 418.
134. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 131 (1999); Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 195
(1987) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that such statements “have traditionally been viewed with
special suspicion”); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.
123, 136 (1968) (explaining that such statements are “inevitably suspect”).
135. 448 U.S. 56, 58-60 (1980).
136. Id. 
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basis of these statements, particularly when wholly or largely uncorroborated,
the risk of inaccurate conviction in any case is substantial, and the argument
for retroactive application of Crawford is compelling. 
As both Judge Noonan and Judge Wallace had anticipated, the Court
observed that a new rule fitting within the second Teague exception would be
extremely rare  and unlikely to be discerned.   In fact, the Court noted “in137 138
the years since Teague, we have rejected every claim that a new rule satisfied
the requirements for watershed status.”   Given the Court’s admitted history,139
it was hardly surprising that it would find that Crawford did not meet the
requirements for a “watershed” rule under the second Teague exception.
Additionally, the Court rejected Judge Noonan’s argument that Crawford
did not announce a new rule, but was entirely consistent with precedent.  140
Even though Douglas v. Alabama  had never been expressly overruled, the141
Court in Whorton v. Bockting concluded that reasonable jurists would have
found that Ohio v. Roberts correctly explained the constitutionally acceptable
mode of analysis of confrontation questions and, thus, Crawford represented
a break with that accepted precedent.   Roberts had swept far too broadly in142
encompassing all arguably reliable statements not subjected to cross-
examination, including presumptively suspect statements made by accomplices
having strong motivation to shift blame or curry favor with the police. 
Conversely, the Court’s holding in Crawford perhaps swept too broadly by not
limiting its testimonial hearsay scope to statements made by accomplices, a
rule that would have properly addressed the factual situation in the case
without reaching beyond to generate additional litigation involving other types
of hearsay.  Many types of hearsay have traditionally been found to be
sufficiently reliable to fit within exceptions to the rule and admissible without
cross-examination. Additionally, in rejecting retroactivity for Crawford, the143
137. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (noting the exception is “extremely
narrow”).
138. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 664 (2001).
139. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418 (2007) (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 416-17.
141. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
142. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. at 416-17.
143. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 825 n.4 (2006) (holding 911 call made
to report emergency admissible); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-56 n.8 (1992) (accepting
reliability of spontaneous declarations and statements made for purpose of medical diagnosis
as “firmly rooted” exceptions to the hearsay rule).  
XXThe issue of whether out-of-court statements may be admitted as “firmly rooted” exceptions
to the hearsay rule deemed so reliable to be admissible without cross-examination remains a
continuing source of litigation in the aftermath of Crawford.  For instance, lower courts have
split on the question of whether laboratory results routinely used in criminal prosecutions may
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss3/1
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Bockting Court noted that the Ninth Circuit panel’s view was in conflict with
“every other Court of Appeals and State Supreme Court that has addressed this
issue.”   On this point, Justice Alito erred as the New Mexico Supreme144
Court had applied Crawford retroactively to a New Mexico inmate convicted
of capital murder in 1982 in State v. Forbes.   In fact, Forbes was pending145
be admitted without cross-examination of the expert or technician who performed the test.  See,
e.g., State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 307-10 (Minn. 2006) (report containing laboratory test
analysis “testimonial” and inadmissible without opportunity to cross-examine).  But see, e.g.,
United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2006) (autopsy report “business record,” not
testimonial); People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 133-41 (Cal. 2007) (DNA test results not
testimonial); Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821, 839-43 (Md. 2006) (distinguishing statements of
“fact” and statements of “opinion” in autopsy reports and ruling latter are testimonial but former
are not); Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 704-05 (Mass. 2005) (certificate of lab
analysis identifying nature and quantity of substance not testimonial); State v. Dedman, 102
P.3d 628 (N.M. 2004) (holding cross-examination of expert actually performing the test not
constitutionally required); People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 867-69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005)
(autopsy report not testimonial); State v. Forte, 629 S.E.2d 137, 142-44 (N.C. 2006) (police
lab’s report of DNA analysis “neutral” business record).
XXThe issue is now before the United States Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 870 N.E.2d 676 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (unpublished table opinion), cert.
granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (2008).  The case was argued in the Supreme Court in November 2008. 
See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Melendez-Diaz (No. 07-591), available at http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-591.pdf.
144. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. at 415.  In a footnote, the Court related lower court
authority rejecting retroactive application of Crawford.  Id. at 415 n.4 (citing as examples Lave
v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2006); Espy v. Massac, 443 F.3d 1362 (11th Cir. 2006);
Murillo v. Frank, 402 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2005); Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783 (6th Cir. 2005);
Brown v. Uphoff, 381 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2004); Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327 (2d Cir.
2004); Edwards v. People, 129 P.3d 977 (Colo. 2006) (en banc); Chandler v. Crosby, 916 So.2d
728 (Fla. 2005); State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23 (Iowa 2005); Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d
451 (Minn. 2006); Ennis v. State, 137 P.3d 1095 (Nev. 2006); In re Markel, 111 P.3d 249
(Wash. 2005)).
145. 119 P.3d 144, 148 (N.M. 2005).  The author represented New Mexico defendant Ralph
Rodney Earnest from 1984 through 2006 as appellate and postconviction counsel.  Forbes
involved an action for extraordinary relief brought by the State Attorney General against the
District Judge, Hon. Jay Forbes, to set aside habeas relief granted for state court defendant
Ralph Rodney Earnest, the real party in interest in this litigation.  Earnest had been convicted
of capital murder based on admission of the inculpatory confession given to police by a
codefendant who admitted his own participation in the crime, but who invoked his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent at trial, resulting in Earnest having no opportunity to cross-
examine him regarding the contents of his confession or his motive for implicating others in the
murder.  Earnest’s conviction was initially reversed, State v. Earnest, 703 P.2d 872, 876 (N.M.
1985), then affirmed on remand, State v. Earnest, 744 P.2d 539 (N.M. 1987), after the United
States Supreme Court vacated the reversal, New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648 (1986). 
Earnest eventually sought relief in a state postconviction action, challenging his conviction by
arguing for retroactive application of the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004).  The state supreme court applied Crawford retroactively to afford relief on
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certiorari in the Supreme Court when Bockting was decided and review was
denied only after the decision was issued.   The New Mexico court’s146
approach was consistent with the Court’s subsequent decision in Danforth.
B. The Disposition of Danforth’s Claim in the State Courts147
Danforth, like Bockting, asserted a confrontation claim in the direct appeal
from his conviction that was finalized prior to the Court’s holding in
Crawford.  Consequently, once the Court’s holding in Crawford provided
support for his Sixth Amendment claim, he relied on it as support in post-
conviction proceedings.  At this stage of the process, of course, potential
success rested on retroactive application of Crawford to the facts of his case.
Danforth’s claim that Crawford should be applied retroactively arose when
he challenged a conviction obtained, in part, on the admission of a videotaped
interview of the complainant in a child sexual assault case.   In the interview,148
the six-year-old complainant described the assaultive act, yet he was found
Earnest’s confrontation claim in Forbes.  119 P.3d at 148.  The Earnest litigation is discussed
more extensively in Part V.A, infra notes 379-412 and accompanying text.  For a thorough
discussion of the history of Earnest’s prosecution and eventual release on grant of state
postconviction relief, see J. Thomas Sullivan, Crawford, Retroactivity and The Importance of
Earnest, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 232 (2008).
146. New Mexico v. Forbes, 549 U.S. 1274 (2007); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Forbes,
549 U.S. 1274 (No. 05-644), 2005 WL 3114493.  Earnest filed a Suggestion of Mootness on
October 17, 2006, based on dismissal of the charges that were pending on remand from the state
supreme court as a result of its decision granting relief from his conviction.  Nevertheless, the
case was carried on the Supreme Court’s docket until the State’s petition was denied on March
5, 2007, New Mexico v. Forbes, 549 U.S. 1274 (2007), after the case was again distributed for
the Court’s March 2nd conference.  The Court issued its opinion in Bockting on February 28,
2007.  Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. at 406. 
147. The United States Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari was following denial of post-
conviction relief, rather than after direct appeal.  The same issue was essentially raised on direct
appeal and twice post-conviction before finally reaching the Supreme Court.  Each time the
Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed and the Minnesota Supreme Court agreed, although
sometimes only with an order denying review.  State v. Danforth, 573 N.W.2d 369 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1997), review denied, (Minn. Feb. 19, 1998), appeal after new sentencing hearing, No.
C5-98-2054, 1999 WL 262143 (Minn. Ct. App. May 4, 1999), review denied, (Minn. July 28,
1999), denial of post-conviction relief aff’d, No. C6-00-699, 2000 WL 1780244 (Minn. Ct. App.
Dec. 5, 2000), review denied (Minn. Feb. 13, 2001), denial of post-conviction relief aff’d, 700
N.W.2d 530 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 718 N.W.2d 451 (Minn. 2006), cert. granted,
Danforth v. Minnesota, 127 S. Ct. 2427 (2007), rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008), opinion following
remand, Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493 (Minn. 2009).  On remand from the United States
Supreme Court, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the denial of post-conviction relief,
holding that Crawford would not be applied retroactively in state proceedings.  Danforth v.
State, 761 N.W.2d 493 (Minn. 2009).
148. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss3/1
2008] DANFORTH, RETROACTIVITY, AND FEDERALISM 449
incompetent to testify at trial because of his inability to answer questions.  149
His report of the offense was corroborated, however, by the testimony of his
five-year-old sister, whom the court did find competent to testify to events
involving her brother and the accused.150
Admission of this type of evidence was addressed by the Supreme Court in
Maryland v. Craig,  in which the Court held that the use of closed-circuit,151
televised testimony of a child, in lieu of live testimony and cross-examination
before the jury, is sufficient to meet the requirement for confrontation when
the trial court is convinced that in-court confrontation threatened to traumatize
the child witness.   The Craig approach recognized that the primary goal of152
confrontation was achieved by cross-examination of the witness, albeit in a
fashion designed to further the important policy interest in protecting child
victims from further emotional injury that could result from the trauma of
testifying in the presence of the accused and before strangers.153
But, in Danforth’s case, the confrontation claim did not arise in a process
identical to that expressly considered by the Craig court.  In particular, the
videotaped interview viewed by jurors in Danforth did not record a deposition
in which the complainant was cross-examined by defense counsel, though not
in the presence of the defendant himself, like the interview in Craig.  154
Instead, the taped interview included a description of the assault by the
complainant, as well as his five-year-old sister.155
The trial court admitted the videotape, finding that it bore sufficient indicia
of reliability to warrant admission, including the fact that the child’s statements
“appeared spontaneous and largely unsolicited by leading questions” and that 
149. Id.  The complainant was found incompetent to testify at trial when he could not
respond to questioning.  Id.
150. Id. 
151. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
152. Id. at 845-54.  The procedure approved in Craig does not require the witness to testify
in the physical presence of the accused during the child’s testimony.  Instead, the testimony was
shown to jurors by closed circuit television, which effectively negated or modified the
requirement of Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), for face-to-face confrontation in the
courtroom at trial.  In Coy, Justice Scalia had written for the majority: “We have never doubted,
therefore, that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with
witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.”  Id. at 1016.  Craig, however, applied a rule of
necessity for excepting face-to-face, in court confrontation, from the general Sixth Amendment
policy preference.  Craig, 497 U.S. at 844-46.
153. Craig, 497 U.S. at 851-52.
154. Id. at 840-42; State v. Danforth, 573 N.W.2d at 372.
155. State v. Danforth, 573 N.W.2d at 372.
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the complainant “lacked any apparent motivation to fabricate the accusation.”  156
The appellate court agreed with this assessment, noting that Minnesota applied
the Idaho v. Wright formula for determining reliability—a showing of
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” —when determining whether157
an out-of-court statement is admissible in the absence of cross-examination.  158
Of course, this is the same test articulated in Ohio v. Roberts.159
Relying on Crawford and the Court’s repudiation of the “particularlized
guarantees of trustworthiness” test,  Danforth challenged the admission of the160
videotaped interview—rather than a deposition—of his child accuser in light
of the fact that the interview itself was made with a clear eye toward its use in
litigation.   In fact, the recorded interview was made in accordance with a161
Minnesota statute expressly authorizing the admission of this type of interview
into evidence,  as the court itself noted.   The state supreme court denied162 163
156. Id.
157. 497 U.S. 805, 815 (1990) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated
by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)).
158. State v. Danforth, 573 N.W.2d at 375.
159. 448 U.S. at 66.
160. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
161. Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451, 454-55 (Minn. 2006).
162. See MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subdiv. 3 (1999), which provides:
An out-of-court statement made by a child under the age of ten years . . . alleging,
explaining, denying, or describing any act of sexual contact or penetration
performed with or on the child . . . not otherwise admissible by statute or rule of
evidence, is admissible as substantive evidence if:
XX(a) the court or person authorized to receive evidence finds, in a hearing
conducted outside of the presence of the jury, that the time, content, and
circumstances of the statement and the reliability of the person to whom the
statement is made provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and
XX(b) the child * * * either:
XX(i) testifies at the proceedings; or
XX(ii) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act;
and
XX(c) the proponent of the statement notifies the adverse party of the proponent’s
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement sufficiently in
advance of the proceeding at which the proponent intends to offer the statement
into evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to
meet the statement.
XXFor purposes of this subdivision, an out-of-court statement includes video,
audio, or other recorded statements.  An unavailable witness includes an
incompetent witness.
Id.
163. State v. Danforth, 573 N.W.2d at 375.
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review,  and Danforth lost in his initial round of post-conviction164
proceedings.165
However, after the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in
Crawford, Danforth again applied for state post-conviction relief, arguing
retroactive application of Crawford as a basis for setting aside his
conviction.   The Minnesota Court of Appeals denied relief, holding that166
Crawford announced a new rule not subject to Teague’s exceptions to the
general rule of non-retroactivity.   In denying relief on Danforth’s claim, the167
state appellate court also agreed with the approaches taken by all federal
circuits other than the Ninth in Bockting v. Bayer  in determining whether168
Crawford fit within one of the Teague exceptions.  169
On review of the court of appeals ruling, the Minnesota Supreme Court also
rejected Danforth’s argument that Crawford should be applied retroactively.  170
The court concluded that the limitations on retroactivity imposed in Teague
effectively precluded state courts from affording broader retroactivity to
Supreme Court decisions announcing new rules of constitutional criminal
procedure than that required by federal due process protection.   The state171
supreme court’s interpretation of the constitutional retroactivity framework
dominated by Teague gave rise to review in the United States Supreme Court
by writ of certiorari.172
164. Id. at 369.  The court of appeals opinion notes that the Minnesota Supreme Court
denied review on February 19, 1998.  The court of appeals remanded for resentencing and
subsequently denied relief on his appeal from the resentencing determination in the trial court. 
State v. Danforth, No. C5-98-2054, 1999 WL 262143 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000), rev. denied,
(Minn. July 28, 1999).
165. Danforth v. State, C6-00-699, 2000 WL 1780244, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2000). 
In his application for post-conviction relief, Danforth alleged, inter alia, that he was denied his
confrontation rights.  Conceding that he had raised the confrontation issue on direct appeal,
Danforth argued that newly discovered evidence showed that the interview with the child
witness admitted in evidence at trial utilized techniques discredited as likely to produce
unreliable information.  Id. at *2 (discussing issue (6) in Danforth’s petition).  The court of
appeals rejected his claim that the evidence supporting his reliability argument was either newly
discovered or newly available.  Id.
166. Danforth v. State, 700 N.W.2d 530, 531 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
167. Id. at 531-35.
168. 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005), amended by 408 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2005).
169. Danforth v. State, 700 N.W.2d at 532-35.
170. Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451 (Minn. 2006).
171. Id. at 455.
172. Danforth v. Minnesota, 127 S. Ct. 2427 (2007).
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IV. Danforth in the Supreme Court
Whorton declared that Crawford constituted a “new rule” not retroactively
applicable to benefit defendants in either state or federal proceedings in which
the prosecution relied on uncrossed, testimonial statements.   But the173
question left unresolved until Danforth v. Minnesota was whether state courts
are free to give retroactive effect to Crawford in a more expansive way than
that allowed by Teague in cases under state law.174
The Court’s decision to grant review in Danforth might have initially
suggested that it would hold that Teague controlled the retroactivity of its
decisions in order to achieve a desired uniform application of federal
constitutional law,  but state courts were free to apply their own175
constitutional and other protections based on state law retroactively in accord
with local policy.  Certainly, the desired uniform interpretation and application
of federal constitutional protections was at the heart of the Court’s broad
assertion of jurisdiction over state court decisions expressly or implicitly
resting on interpretations of federal constitutional protections expanding the
Court’s own holdings in Michigan v. Long.   176
However, in an interesting split decision, the Court did not rest its decision
in Danforth on concern for a uniform application of federal constitutional law,
divorcing interpretation of federal constitutional protections from the scope of
their application.   The Teague retroactivity doctrine does serve to ensure a177
uniform application of “new rules” announced by the Court, imposing a duty
on state courts to apply those decisions benefitting state court defendants
retroactively when the Court holds the decisions are to be given retroactive
effect as a matter of federal due process.  However, as the Court’s post-Teague
jurisprudence demonstrates, the burden is not particularly onerous because no
procedural protections have actually been deemed retroactive under the second
Teague exception.   178
173. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 421 (2007).
174. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1033 (2008).
175. E.g., Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771 (2001) (reversing “[b]ecause the
Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision on rehearing is flatly contrary to this Court’s controlling
precedent . . . .”).
176. 463 U.S. 1031, 1040, 1043 n.8 (1983) (“The state courts are required to apply federal
constitutional standards, and they necessarily create a considerable body of ‘federal law’ in the
process.”). 
177. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. at 1041.
178. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. at 418.
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A. Rebutting the Minnesota Courts’ Retroactivity Position
The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the issue of Crawford
retroactivity, which was decided adversely to Danforth by the intermediate
court.   Danforth argued that regardless of whether Crawford applied179
retroactively as a matter of due process, the state court was free to apply it
retroactively because it announced a “new rule” fitting within either of the
Teague exceptions to non-retroactivity.   The state supreme court rejected180
Danforth’s argument, relying on its decision in State v. Houston,  where the181
court held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington182
would not be applied retroactively absent an express declaration requiring
retroactive application by the United States Supreme Court.   The Houston183
court, however, did not hold that Teague forbids retroactive application of
federal constitutional “new rules” by state courts.   Instead, the court rejected184
the argument that, in fact, the limitations imposed upon sentencing discretion
by Blakely did not fit within Teague’s exceptions.185
In O’Meara v. State, the Minnesota court articulated its understanding of the
mandatory nature of Teague when dealing with the duty to apply federal
constitutional “new rules” articulated by the Supreme Court.   The O’Meara186
court, however, did not address the question ultimately raised by Danforth:
whether Minnesota courts could apply a “new rule” retroactively as a matter
of state law or policy when the Supreme Court did not expressly provide for
retroactive application as a matter of federal due process.   It did, however,187
hold that because O’Meara’s case was not final when the Court’s decision in
179. Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451, 461 (Minn. 2006).
180. Id. at 455.  The court observed that Danforth raised the question of the state court’s
authority to apply Crawford retroactively despite the fact that it would not qualify for
retroactive application under Teague for the first time in his appeal to the state supreme court. 
Nevertheless, the court addressed the issue “in the interest[] of justice.”  Id.  By ruling on the
merits, the state court avoided the application of procedural default that would have foreclosed
consideration of the issue by the United States Supreme Court on certiorari.  
181. 702 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 2005).
182. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
183. Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d at 455.
184. Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 273.
185. Id. at 271-74.  Blakely held that enhanced sentences based upon particular
circumstances requires pleading and proof of those factors warranting increased sentences by
the trier of fact, applying the principle of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000),
to certain sentencing discretionary decisions traditionally exercised by trial judges within
statutory frameworks.  Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303.
186. O’Meara v. State, 679 N.W.2d 334, 339-40 (Minn. 2004).
187. Id. at 336.
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Apprendi v. New Jersey  was announced, he would be entitled to the benefit188
of that holding based on the requirement that even “new rules” are applicable
to issues raised in pending litigation not final at the time the Supreme Court
announces its decision.   It also made an interesting observation that would189
later prove somewhat ironic in the context of Danforth: “It is axiomatic that
as Minnesota’s highest court we determine whether our decisions on state law
are given retroactive or prospective effect.”   It did so, explaining its own190
doctrine of retroactivity for state law decisions that parallels the approach
taken by the Supreme Court in Griffith.191
The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that it could not apply Crawford
retroactively on Danforth’s claim, consistent with its own precedent.   In192
O’Meara, it had relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in American Trucking
Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith  in distinguishing between its authority to give its own193
decisions on matters of state law retroactive effect and its authority to apply
federal decisions retroactively.   Applying Smith, the court explained this194
difference on the question of retroactivity:
In this case however, we are called upon to determine whether
O’Meara is entitled to benefit from a new rule of federal
constitutional criminal procedure.  In this context, we are
compelled to follow the lead of the Supreme Court in determining
when a decision is to be afforded retroactive treatment.195
Later, in Danforth, the state court again relied on Smith  and Michigan v.196
Payne  to explain that it considered itself bound by the Supreme Court’s197
retroactivity doctrine in rejecting the argument that it could afford retroactive
application to federal constitutional decisions as a matter of state law.198
The United States Supreme Court, however, rejected the Minnesota court’s
reading of Smith and Payne in considering Danforth’s claim that states could
provide broader retroactivity to federal constitutional violation decisions than
188. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
189. O’Meara, 679 N.W.2d at 339-40 (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328
(1987)).
190. Id. at 338.
191. Id.
192. Danforth v. Minnesota, 718 N.W.2d 451, 460-61 (Minn. 2006).
193. 496 U.S. 167, 177 (1990).
194. O’Meara, 679 N.W.2d at 338-40.
195. Id. at 339 (Smith, 496 U.S. at 177-78).
196. Smith, 496 U.S. 167.
197. 412 U.S. 47 (1973).
198. Danforth v. Minnesota, 718 N.W.2d 451, 456 (Minn. 2006).
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that commanded by Teague.   Payne was decided prior to Teague and dealt199
with a particularly fact-specific question.   The state court had applied the200
prohibition against vindictive sentencing on remand recognized by the Court
in North Carolina v. Pearce  in a pending state case prior to a final201
determination on retroactive application being made by the Supreme Court.  202
When the Court held that Pearce was not to be afforded retroactive effect in
Payne, it reversed because the state court had cautiously applied Pearce
retroactively,  awaiting a definitive holding by the Supreme Court on203
retroactivity.   204
Thus, the Danforth majority noted that Payne, arising in the context of the
state court’s attempt to anticipate a ruling on mandatory retroactive application
as a matter of due process, had not addressed the issue of state authority to
apply federal constitutional decisions retroactively at all.   Payne had not205
foreclosed broader retroactive application of federal constitutional “new rules”
because of the context in which the issue arose.   In fact, the majority also206
noted that Pennsylvania  had expressly afforded retroactive application of the207
Court’s holding in Batson v. Kentucky  despite the Court’s own conclusion208
that Batson would not be given mandatory retroactive effect as a matter of
federal due process in Allen v. Hardy.209
Similarly, the majority held that the Minnesota court had misapprehended
the holding in Smith.   There, the retroactivity issue dealt with the right to a210
refund of taxes paid to the State of Arkansas under a scheme similar to that
199. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1042 (2008).
200. Id. at 1042-43 (citing Payne, 412 U.S. 47).
201. 395 U.S. 711, 723-26 (1969).
202. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. at 1042-43 (citing Payne, 412 U.S. at 49).
203. Id. at 1043.  The Court observed that in Payne, the Michigan court had applied Pearce
retroactively, expressly noting that it was doing so pending clarification from the Court on this
question.  Id. (citing Payne, 412 U.S. at 49). 
204. People v. Payne, 191 N.W.2d 375, 378 n.2 (Mich. 1971) (“We decline to predict the
high Court’s answer to the question of Pearce’s retroactive or prospective application, but we
will apply Pearce in the present case in order to instruct our trial courts as to the Michigan
interpretation of an ambiguous portion of Pearce . . . pending clarification by the United States
Supreme Court.”).
205. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. at 1043.
206. Id.
207. Pennsylvania v. McCormick, 519 A.2d 442, 444-47 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (announcing
state court not bound by federal retroactivity doctrine in applying Batson retroactively in case
on direct appeal).
208. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
209. 478 U.S. 255 (1986) (per curiam).
210. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. at 1045-46 (citing Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v.
Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990)).
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declared unconstitutional in a case arising out of a challenge in Pennsylvania,
American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner.   The complainants in Smith211
argued that they were entitled to refunds because the Court’s decision that the
tax levy violated constitutional protections arguably meant that taxes paid were
illegally extracted.212
Once again, the retroactivity issue arose in an odd procedural context.  This
time, however, it arose because the Court’s divisions in the two American
Trucking cases did not produce a clear rule with regard to the claimed
entitlement to refund,  as Justice Stevens explained for the Danforth213
majority.   He noted that Justice Scalia had voted with the dissenters in214
Scheiner  and would have found Pennsylvania’s highway user tax levy215
constitutionally acceptable.   Subsequently, when a similar state-imposed tax216
was before the Court in Smith, the plurality decision rejected retroactive
application of Scheiner to require refund of taxes collected by Arkansas prior
to the Court’s invalidation of the comparable taxation scheme in Scheiner.217
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment in Smith,  however, but explained218
that once the Scheiner majority had found the tax unconstitutional—despite his
disagreement with that decision—he believed that the tax could not be
constitutionally levied after the Court issued the decision in Scheiner.   He219
based his concurrence on the reasonable expectations of litigants relying on the
doctrine of stare decisis and the principle of adherence to precedent.220
Justice Scalia’s core concern is apparently that the Court not engage in
innovative interpretation of the Constitution, but remain faithful to its
immutable principles.  Consequently, as in Scheiner, the announcement of a
holding that is prospective only in nature is inconsistent with his position that
the Court itself is not free to articulate new constitutional values, but is bound
by the text and original understanding of the document.  The prospective
nature of a ruling suggests that the majority has engaged in interpretive license
that he finds inconsistent with his strict constructionist approach.  Balancing
211. Smith, 496 U.S. 167; Am. Trucking Assn’s, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
212. Smith, 496 U.S. at 172.  This claim was sufficiently persuasive that Justice Blackmun,
sitting as Circuit Justice, ordered the taxes paid be held in escrow pending disposition of the
question of retroactive application of Scheiner.  Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v Gray, 483 U.S.
1306, 1309-10 (1987).
213. Smith, 496 U.S. 167; Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266.
214. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. at 1043-46.
215. Id. (citing Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 303 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
216. Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 303-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217. Smith, 496 U.S. at 182.
218. Id. at 200 (Scalia, J., concurring).
219. Id. at 200-01.
220. Id. at 204-05.
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his constitutional view, however, is his belief that once the Scheiner majority
found the tax unconstitutional, it could not arbitrarily limit relief such that the
underlying holding itself reflected a new interpretation of the Constitution.221
Justice Scalia argued that the Court could not simply change the meaning
of the Constitution prospectively.  If the Pennsylvania taxation scheme
violated it then, he contended, the tax had always been levied in violation of
the Constitution.   The Smith plurality held that Arkansas and out-of-state222
221. Thus, litigants were entitled to rely on their understanding of the law—that states could
impose taxes disproportionately greater on out-of-state entities prior to the Court’s decision in
Scheiner, but once the Court announced its decision in Scheiner, it was no longer acceptable for
other states to levy comparable taxes.  However, in his view in Smith, taxes levied by Arkansas
after the announcement of the decision in Scheiner were subject to refund, according to Justice
Scalia, while those levied prior to the announcement of Scheiner were not.
222. Smith, 496 U.S. at 204-05.  This raises a point never addressed in the retroactivity
decisions.  Given Justice Scalia’s doctrinal position with regard to the Court’s interpretation of
the Constitution, one might question how a “new rule” could ever be identified, since all rules
of constitutional source are immutable.  Yet, Justice Scalia seems to have succumbed to
Teague’s “new rule” formulation since he did not dissent in Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406
(2007), where the Court unanimously rejected retroactive application of Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  If true to his view of Scheiner and Smith, he might have been
expected to argue in favor of retroactive application of Crawford, at least with respect to the
requirement that accomplice testimony be tested by adequate cross-examination. Retroactive
application of the holding in Crawford would have been implicit in the Court’s recognition that
its confrontation reasoning in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S.
530 (1986) had departed from the correct meaning of the Sixth Amendment.  That is unless, of
course, explication of constitutional language means one thing when considering unfair taxation
and another when the issue involves criminal prosecution resulting in imprisonment or
execution.  
XXFor instance, Justice Scalia did not join four other Justices who dissented from the denial
of a stay of execution in Aguilar v. Dretke, 547 U.S. 1161 (2006), where Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer voted to stay the execution of a Texas petitioner asserting a
Crawford claim based on admission of an accomplice’s uncrossed statement to police at the
capital sentencing phase of his state court trial.  The petitioner applied for the stay following the
Court’s grant of certiorari on May 15, 2006, in Whorton v. Bockting, 547 U.S. 1127 (2006).  See
Ex parte Aguilar, No. WR-36242-03, 2006 WL 1412666, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. May 22,
2006).  Aguilar’s Crawford claim was preserved and properly before the state court and United
States Supreme Court on the question of Crawford’s retroactivity.  Id. at *6 (Price, J.,
dissenting).  Because Aguilar did not get the fifth vote for a stay, despite the votes of four
Justices needed for grant of certiorari on his claim, he was executed on May 20, 2006, and his
pending cert petition was dismissed by the Court as moot on June 19th (Aguilar v. Quarterman,
547 U.S. 1204 (2006)), months before the Court actually rejected retroactive application of
Crawford in Bockting on February 28, 2007.  Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406.
XXIn fact, the Smith plurality argued that retroactive application in the Griffith
context—application of new rules to cases pending on direct review at the time the new rule is
announced—represents a far more persuasive circumstance in criminal than civil contexts,
where retroactive application that favors one party necessarily disadvantages another.  Smith,
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trucker taxpayers were not necessarily entitled to a refund because Scheiner
did not apply retroactively to statutory schemes existing prior to the date on
which the Court declared the tax unconstitutional.   The dissent  agreed that223 224
the Arkansas statute was invalid based on the holding in Scheiner,  but225
concluded that the refund right was not resolved simply by retroactive
application of Scheiner as a matter of federal retroactivity doctrine because
retroactivity might also be predicated on state law concerns.   Instead, the226
dissent argued for application of a Griffith-like rule that prescribed retroactive
application as a matter of federal law for those similarly-situated litigants
whose claims were pending at the time of announcement of a controlling
constitutional decision.   But, the dissent also observed that the Arkansas227
court had considered itself bound not to afford retroactive effect to Scheiner
as a matter of federal law and argued that the question of retroactive
application should also be decided by the state courts in accord with state
law.   Ultimately, the effect of the holding in Smith was to require Arkansas228
to refund taxes paid after the date of the decision in Scheiner, rather than
extending the decision to include all taxes paid after the date on which the
legal challenge to the tax was initiated.229
Presumably, Justice Scalia would have voted for retroactive application of
Scheiner, including a right to refund of taxes paid, had he agreed with the
Scheiner majority that the taxation scheme was, in fact, unconstitutional.  230
496 U.S. at 197-99.  But, as Justice Scalia suggested in his opinion concurring in the judgment
in Smith, his real concern may simply lie in his criticism of the “jurisprudential quagmire” that
he believed characterized the Court’s “negative” Commerce Clause decisions, resulting in
“destabilization” of the law in this area.  Id. at 202 (Scalia, J., concurring).
223. Id. at 200.
224. Id. at 205 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 211, 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner,
483 U.S. 266 (1987)).  The Court had previously vacated an Arkansas decision upholding the
tax, American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Gray, 707 S.W.2d 759 (Ark. 1986), rev’d 483 U.S. 1306
(1987), in light of Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266., and on remand, the Arkansas Supreme Court held
the tax unconstitutional.  Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Gray, 746 S.W.2d 377 (Ark. 1988).
226. Smith, 496 U.S. at 224-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
227. Id. at 214-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 225 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The state supreme court, on remand, had concluded
that it could only apply Scheiner prospectively as a matter of federal constitutional law.  Gray,
746 S.W.2d at 378.  But, that court also acknowledged that the taxes held in escrow were
subject to refund.  Id. at 378-79.
229. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 792 S.W.2d 616, 616 (Ark. 1990), on remand from
496 U.S. 167 (finding that not only was refund of taxes paid into the escrow account on order
of Justice Blackmun,  American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Gray, 483 U.S. 1306 (1987), required,
but that taxes paid following the date of issuance of the Scheiner decision, 483 U.S. 266, were
also subject to refund).
230. Smith, 496 U.S. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia observed:
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According to Justice Stevens, the proper view of Smith’s retroactivity question
would have been resolved by looking to the dissenting justices’ position,
factoring in Justice Scalia’s general approach to constitutional interpretation.  231
But, he also expressly observed that nothing written in Smith had indicated that
Arkansas could not order a refund of the taxes collected as a matter of state
law.232
Justice Stevens then explained that the unresolved question of retroactive
application of its decisions, which in the taxation area includes the refund of
taxes paid as a matter of due process, had been addressed subsequently in
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation.   Because of its imprecision,233
however, the Harper Court’s explanation of the federal due process
requirement left the ultimate refund question up to the states.   In fact, the234
Harper Court merely admonished states to fashion a remedy consistent with
federal due process principles, ultimately leaving the question to be resolved
by individual states as matters of state law, so long as the remedy adopted
complies with federal due process standards.235
The Danforth majority, therefore, concluded that neither of the decisions
relied on by the Minnesota Supreme Court supported the state court’s
conclusion that it could provide no greater retroactive application to the
Court’s decisions than that imposed by the Court itself within the Teague
framework.   In fact, the majority concluded: “They [Payne and Smith]236
provide no support for the proposition that federal law places a limit on state
authority to provide remedies for federal constitutional violations.”  237
Consequently, the majority held that state courts are free to apply Supreme
Something is wrong, however, if I must take that position with respect to the
pre-Scheiner taxes at issue in the present case. Believing that Arkansas was fully
entitled to impose the taxes, I would nonetheless make the fifth vote to penalize
it for having done so even during the period (pre-Scheiner) when our opinions
announced it could lawfully do so-and I would impose this injustice in the name
of stare decisis, that is, in the interest of protecting settled expectations.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
231. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1045 (2008).
232. Id. at n.22.  But, as Justice Stevens noted in his dissenting opinion in Smith, Arkansas
follows the common law rule that taxes voluntarily paid cannot be recovered.  Smith, 496 U.S.
at 207 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
233. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. at 1045 (citing Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509
U.S. 86 (1993)).
234. Id. (citing Harper, 509 U.S. at 100) (“[W]e declared the similar tax
unconstitutional–but that this did not necessarily entitle the petitioners to a full refund.”).
235. Harper, 509 U.S. at 101-02.
236. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. at 1045.
237. Id. at 1045-46.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2008
460 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  61:425
Court decisions recognizing “new rules” retroactively according to their own
retroactivity policies.238
B. Addressing the Dissent’s Concern for National Application of Law
The dissenting opinion in Danforth, written by Chief Justice Roberts and
joined by Justice Kennedy, argued primarily from a policy position favoring
a uniform application of federal constitutional law.   Having rejected the239
argument that prior decisions had mandated extension of the Teague doctrine
to govern state courts in the retroactive application of federal constitutional
rules, the majority then addressed the issue pressed by Chief Justice Roberts
in his dissent.   240
The Chief Justice stressed that the Supreme Court “is the final arbiter of
federal law” and thus, argued that the question of retroactivity of its decisions
should be resolved by the Court, rather than by state courts.   To permit states241
to determine retroactivity as a matter of state law or policy, as opposed to
consistently with the Court’s own retroactivity determination, would create a
situation in which a defendant in one jurisdiction might benefit from a
retroactive application of a new rule, while a defendant in another—convicted
of the same offense—would not; one might escape a death sentence as a
consequence while the other would be executed.   For Chief Justice Roberts,242
this result would be “startling.”   He cautioned: “That result is contrary to the243
Supremacy Clause and the Framers’ decision to vest in ‘one supreme Court’
the responsibility and authority to ensure the uniformity of federal law.”244
Following the full development of his argument countering the majority’s
analysis, the Chief Justice finally explained, “This dissent is compelled not
simply by disagreement over how to read those cases, but by the fundamental
issues at stake—our role under the Constitution as the final arbiter of federal
law, both as to its meaning and its reach, and the accompanying duty to ensure
the uniformity of that federal law.”   Thus, from his perspective, the issue245
presented in Danforth was primarily concerned with the preservation of a
uniform interpretation and application of federal constitutional law.   246
238. Id. at 1042.
239. Id. at 1047-48 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).
240. Id. at 1047.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1047-48.
244. Id. at 1048.
245. Id. at 1058.
246. See id. at 1047-59.
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Uniformity of interpretation is, of course, consistent with the Court’s
determination in reserving the right to review state court decisions construing
federal constitutional provisions claimed in Michigan v. Long.   But the Chief247
Justice offered very little in the way of compelling argument for the
proposition that federalism is threatened in any way by state court autonomy
in the determination of when to apply Supreme Court precedent retroactively. 
Instead, he suggested in his dissent that state courts should logically be
permitted to decide whether to retroactively apply new rules even when the
Court has dictated that they must be applied retroactively consistent with due
process.   In support of his argument, he pointed to the reservation of the248
question of mandatory retroactive application of new rules fitting within the
second Teague exception in the state postconviction process.   The majority249
noted:
We note at the outset that this case does not present the questions
whether States are required to apply “watershed” rules in state post-
conviction proceedings, whether the Teague rule applies to cases
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000 ed., Supp. V), or whether
Congress can alter the rules of retroactivity by statute. 
Accordingly, we express no opinion on these issues.250
For the dissent, the majority’s express refusal to answer these questions in
Danforth reflected recognition that its conclusion was not consistent with the
Court’s prior decisions.   But the majority’s refusal to answer the questions251
it recognized does not necessarily mean that the answers would undermine its
decision.
1. The Import of the Majority’s Unanswered Questions
Clearly, two of the three questions reserved by the majority further
implicate federalism values.  The first unanswered question, relating to state
application of “watershed” rules in state post-conviction proceedings, directly
implicates the scope of the Court’s authority to enforce its own retroactivity
determination.  This issue did not need to be addressed in Danforth in order to
resolve the issue before the Court, but it is interesting that the majority would
hold that this question of application in state post-conviction proceedings
remains in doubt.  Assuming that the Court were to identify a “new,”
247. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
248. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. at 1058.
249. Id. (“The majority carefully reserves that question, see ante, at 1034, n. 4, confirming
that the majority regards it as open.”).
250. Id. at 1034 n.4.
251. Id. at 1058.
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“watershed” rule of constitutional criminal procedure, a possibility that the
Court itself has viewed as doubtful,  the rule would be subject to retroactive252
application as a matter of federal due process, consistent with the second
exception to the general principle of non-retroactivity adopted in Teague.
a) Teague Retroactivity and State Post-conviction Litigation
It is difficult to imagine that such a hypothetical “watershed” rule would not
then be applicable in state post-conviction proceedings as a matter of federal
due process.  Otherwise, the retroactivity promise of Teague in recognizing the
second exception for “watershed” rules would make little sense.  Those state
cases still pending in the trial process or direct appeal would be controlled by
the “new rule” by application of Griffith.  The only state court cases which
would invoke retroactive application of the “watershed” rule promised by
Teague would be those cases finalized at the time of the announcement of the
“new rule,” and the only reasonable application of the retroactivity guarantee
would be in state post-conviction proceedings.  
However, state courts would not necessarily be required to grant relief on
the announcement of a new rule because requirements for preservation of error
could be applied to frustrate litigants attempting to rely on the new rule. 
Failure to claim the right ultimately recognized by the Supreme Court would
arguably follow a state’s regular and consistent use of procedural default to bar
relief on claims not preserved in the trial process.  Thus, even though Teague
might require that state litigants be entitled to claim the benefit of the
“watershed” rule, a failure to have asserted a claim to reliance on the rule
ultimately recognized might result in forfeiture of the claim.  Failure to
anticipate and preserve the claim could frustrate prospects for relief, even
though preservation of the claim would have been futile based on existing
precedent at the time that a timely objection or other action necessary for
preservation would have been required.253
Additionally, even assuming that state litigants would be entitled to rely on
a “new,” “watershed” rule warranting retroactive application, some litigants
likely would not obtain relief simply because the violation would prove
harmless.  Because the new rule would necessarily implicate a federal
constitutional protection, the Chapman harmless error doctrine  would apply254
252. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 667 n.7 (2001) (“As we have recognized, it is unlikely that
any of these watershed rules ‘ha[s] yet to emerge.’”).
253. For consideration of the “futility exception” in constitutional litigation, see Brent E.
Newton, An Argument for Reviving the Actual Futility Exception to the Supreme Court’s
Procedural Default Doctrine, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 521 (2002).
254. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).  Under Chapman, the burden is placed on
the prosecution to demonstrate that constitutional trial error was harmless beyond a reasonable
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss3/1
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unless the rule addressed a matter of structural error,  requiring reversal255
without proof of any actual prejudice to the accused.256
Thus, even though a federal constitutional protection recognized as a “new,”
“watershed” rule by the Supreme Court would apply retroactively in state
litigation, the retroactivity requirement would not necessarily result in
uniformity with regard to the actual application of the rule.  Instead, the
availability of the rule would not compromise state procedural default
doctrines and harmlessness determinations, so that the retroactivity would
guarantee only access, not relief.
b) Teague and Federal Post-conviction Litigation
The second question deliberately left unanswered by the Danforth Court
involves the application of the Teague retroactivity doctrine to post-conviction
actions brought by federal defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  To the
extent that Teague rests on a policy decision arising from the relationship of
federal and state courts in the protection of federal constitutional rights, the
decision does not implicate the same core federalism value when federal
convictions are involved.   Thus, in a pre-Teague decision, Davis v. United257
States, a petitioner convicted in a federal proceeding was entitled to rely on an
intervening change in the controlling legal principle to challenge his
conviction in a federal post-conviction action under § 2255.258
doubt in order to avoid reversal.  Id. at 24.
255. Structural error involves error that cannot be subjected to analysis for harm precisely
because harm cannot be assessed in light of the trial record.  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.
279, 309 (1991).  For instance, claims of improper exclusion of jurors based on ethnicity, see
Batson v. Kentucky,  476 U.S. 79 (1986), or attitudes toward capital punishment, see
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), are not susceptible to prejudice analysis because
it is impossible to accurately assess the behavior of a jury had the excluded juror been seated
and served. 
256. In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), the Court held that a constitutionally-
defective jury instruction that impermissibly altered the burden of proof imposed upon the
prosecution in a criminal case constituted “structural error” not amenable to prejudice analysis. 
The Court explained that any attempt to assess harm would require speculation on consequences
of the error that would be “unquantifiable and indeterminate.”  Id. at 281-82.  In contrast, trial
error claims, or those that occur “during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may
therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented . . .” are
evaluated in terms of prejudice to the accused.  Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08.
257. See State v. Evans, 114 P.3d 627, 633 (Wash. 2005) (“As Chief Justice Rehnquist
sagely noted, Teague was ‘grounded in important considerations of federal-state relations.’ 
Limiting a state statute on the basis of the federal court’s caution in interfering with State’s self-
governance would be, at least, peculiar.” (citation omitted)).
258. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974).
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But lower courts have concluded that the Court’s post-Davis decision in
Teague changed the “legal landscape of retroactivity on collateral review,” as
the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia observed in Price v.
United States.   The Price court held that Davis was effectively limited, first259
by Teague, and then by the retroactivity limitations imposed by the
amendment of the federal habeas process in the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).   The unresolved question was framed260
in Price in terms of Teague’s effect on retroactivity principles relating to
substantive decisions:
Because Teague arose in the context of a so-called procedural
constitutional rule, some have concluded that Teague is limited to
only procedural constitutional rules, and that the Davis case
continues to control cases involving substantive changes in
statutory law.  Analytically, then, the key questions to be answered
are: what scope did the Supreme Court intend for Teague, and
whether Teague abrogated Davis.  In other words, does Davis
survive Teague?  Neither the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, nor the Supreme Court itself has offered lower courts any
clear guidance on this issue, and no higher precedent guides this
Court.261
The Second Circuit, in Ianniello v. United States,  disagreed with the262
suggestion that Davis had been abrogated by Teague, holding that changes in
substantive law—such as questions of evidentiary sufficiency in light of a new 
259. 959 F. Supp. 310, 314 (E.D. Va. 1997).
260. Id. at 314-15; see Nuñez v. United States, 96 F.3d 990 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that
AEDPA effectively limited retroactivity doctrine with respect to successive federal petitions,
although not initial petitions).  Although the amended federal habeas statute permits a litigant
to assert a claim in a second or successive petition based upon a new rule declared retroactive
by the Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (1996), the Seventh Circuit observed that the
change in law relied upon by Nuñez did not involve recognition of a new rule of constitutional
procedure, but rather a change in the interpretation of a statute by the Court in Bailey v. United
States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), relating to proof required to support conviction for “us[ing] or
carry[ing]” a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking offense.  Nuñez, 96 F.3d at
992.  Consequently, even if Nuñez could have claimed a change of law consistent with Davis,
it would not have applied to a successive petition following the change in the habeas statute
with passage of AEDPA.
261. Price, 959 F. Supp. at 315.
262. 10 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1993).
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interpretation of statutory language by the Supreme Court —continue to be263
cognizable in federal habeas proceedings under Davis.  264
The split in authority regarding the scope of the Teague retroactivity
doctrine suggests that the Danforth Court properly decided not to express a
view on its application in the federal habeas process.  But this unresolved
question does not implicate federalism concerns because it does not address
retroactivity issues in state proceedings.
c) Legislative Action and Retroactivity
The third unresolved question, relating to possible congressional action in
altering the rules of retroactivity, would perhaps have particular impact in the
disposition of federal constitutional claims in the federal habeas process. 
Congress could theoretically undercut the scope of Teague to require that
federal habeas courts apply Supreme Court decisions announcing “new” rules
retroactively to petitions brought by state court defendants.  With regard to
amendment of the federal habeas statute to expand retroactive reliance on
“new” rules announced by the Court in actions brought by state inmates, the
impact on federalism would be considerable because this action would alter the
deference paid to finality of state court judgments by the federal courts. 
However, given the now-entrenched statutory limitations imposed on federal
habeas courts in reviewing state court decisions, it would seem doubtful that
Congress would reverse the course taken in adopting AEDPA to restrict
federal court intervention in state court prosecutions.
Alternatively, Congress could expand the retroactivity doctrine to include
federal post-conviction actions, addressing concerns about the continuing
viability of Davis by expressly providing that federal petitioners could rely on
“new” substantive or procedural rules in challenging convictions under
previous law.  Similarly, it could legislatively resolve the issue by holding that
collateral relief is not available based on a change in substantive interpretation
by the Court.  In either of the latter events, however, the change in retroactivity
policy would not implicate federalism issues.
2. Uniformity in Administration of Federal Constitutional Law
The argument favoring a uniform administration of federal constitutional
law advanced by the Chief Justice makes some sense.  But, in reality, there is
precious little uniformity in the application of any system or body of law while
the Supreme Court’s preference for unity of interpretation claimed in
263. See Nuñez, 96 F.3d at 992; see also discussion supra note 260.
264. Ianniello, 10 F.3d at 62-63; accord Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d. 361, 368 (2d
Cir. 1997).
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Michigan v. Long clearly has established a well-defined line of authority
between it and state courts.  Similarly, the Teague retroactivity doctrine, which
prevents federal habeas courts from engaging in interpretation of constitutional
guarantees resulting in new rules or new applications of existing precedent to
novel situations, expands the parameters of the Court’s exclusive authority
within the federal judicial system.265
a) The “Illusion” of Uniformity and Practical Reality
The simple fact is that even when trial and appellate courts apply Supreme
Court precedent governing federal constitutional criminal procedure
protections, the actual application will never be uniform.  Some trial judges
will undoubtedly apply precedent from a perspective favoring the prosecution;
fewer will apply precedent in a manner favoring the criminal defendant,
particularly in state courts where prosecutions focus on street crimes, rather
than dealing in greater part with white collar criminal activity.  Even when
judges strive to apply precedent faithfully, similar fact situations will
nevertheless result in different rulings based on the differences in witness
credibility and the persuasiveness of counsel.  One of the fascinating features
of the criminal law is that similar fact patterns prove so dissimilar when the
peculiar personalities of the actors are factored into the overall equation.  
The subjective evaluations made by trial judges of similar factual contexts
necessarily result in some lack of uniformity in the application of federal
constitutional protections.  This lack of uniformity occurs even when judges
strive earnestly to apply constitutional protections in a way that ensures
uniformity of interpretation.  The suggestion that the United States
Constitution must be applied uniformly ignores the practical realities that
characterize practice and decision-making in the trial courts, where application
of constitutional protections is less dependent on the text of precedent than on
the perception of the individual judge exercising her discretion in applying that
precedent.
This is particularly true in litigation of issues that are almost wholly
dependent on the perceptions of trial judges and, consequently, are committed
to their discretion as decisionmakers on questions of fact.  One generic class
of issues that is dependent on the discretion of trial judges involves the legality
of searches and seizures.  In these cases, when challenges to the admission of
seized evidence are based on lack of probable cause or insufficient support for
a search warrant, the issuance of the warrant is ultimately dependent in some
sense on assessment of the credibility of the information in the supporting
265. E.g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1994); see supra note 91 and
accompanying text.
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affidavit.   These issues, moreover, are perhaps the most often litigated266
federal constitutional claims precisely because suppression of the seized
evidence often precludes the prosecution from going forward regardless of the
accused’s actual guilt.267
Yet, in Stone v. Powell, the United States Supreme Court held that
relitigation of search and seizure claims based upon alleged violations of the
Fourth Amendment would no longer remain within the scope of review by
federal habeas courts if the litigants had already been afforded an opportunity
to fully and fairly litigate the claim in the state courts.   In so holding, the268
Court effectively insulated the bulk of state court determinations from review
in the federal system except by petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court itself.   The general rule precluding federal habeas review of these269
claims results, almost necessarily, in a lack of uniformity in the administration
of federal constitutional law throughout the nation, committing to state courts
266. For instance in Davis v. State, the Arkansas Supreme Court reiterated its standard of
review of trial court findings in examining search and seizure claims: “‘[W]e have given
considerable weight to the findings of the trial judge in the resolution of evidentiary conflicts. 
We must defer to the superior position of the trial judge to pass upon the credibility of
witnesses.’”  94 S.W.3d 892, 894-95 (Ark. 2003) (quoting State v. Osborn, 566 S.W.2d 139,
140 (Ark. 1978)) (citations omitted).  The court also explained that this approach is consistent
with that taken by the United States Supreme Court in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,
699-700 (1996), where the Court noted:
[W]e hasten to point out that a reviewing court should take care both to review
findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences
drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers. 
* * *
In a similar vein, our cases have recognized that a police officer may draw
inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists. 
. . .  An appeals court should give due weight to a trial court’s finding that the
officer was credible and the inference was reasonable.
Davis, 94 S.W.3d at 895 (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699-700 (citations omitted)).
267. With respect to the cost of suppression of illegally seized evidence, the Supreme Court
observed in Stone v. Powell:
The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at trial and on direct review are
well known: the focus of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein, are
diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central
concern in a criminal proceeding. Moreover, the physical evidence sought to be
excluded is typically reliable and often the most probative information bearing on
the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
428 U.S. 465, 489-90 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
268. Id. at 493-94.
269. The majority’s action drew criticism from Justice Brennan, who questioned the Court’s
authority to exclude a class of claims from consideration in the federal habeas process.  Id. at
502-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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not only the primary duty, but almost certainly the entire duty, for enforcing
federal constitutional privacy protections in state proceedings.  
Because the function of the exclusionary rule is deterrence of police
misconduct,  arguably the restriction imposed in Stone v. Powell does not270
vindicate personal privacy rights of individual defendants.  But the holding
does permit a lack of uniformity in the enforcement of Fourth Amendment
protections against potential offending law enforcement officers and, in this
sense, results at least theoretically in an uneven application of Fourth
Amendment protection by the state courts.  Of course, if state courts
consistently apply Supreme Court Fourth Amendment precedent uniformly,
the threat to a goal of uniform administration of federal constitutional law
remains only theoretical.   In contrast, Chief Justice Roberts’s concerns in271
Danforth are not simply theoretical; instead, he correctly observes that the
holding opens the door to inconsistent application of federal constitutional law
in the administration of state court retroactivity doctrine or policy.   But it272
would be naïve to suggest that state trial and appellate judges always rule in
a consistent fashion in applying Supreme Court precedent.273
b) State Constitutional Law and Non-Uniformity
Moreover, uniform application of federal constitutional precedent is, in a
sense, compromised by the existence of state constitutional law.  Although
state courts may view rights expansively as matters of state constitutional law
without directly implicating federal constitutional values, state constitutional
protections have largely been recognized with reference to analogous federal
constitutional language.  Often, the recognition of a more expansive protection
270. Id. at 492.
271. Yet, as the Court itself continues to address novel questions arising in the context of
search and seizure claims, the potential for lack of uniformity in understanding or application
of its precedents increases, regardless of any lack of uniformity attributable to disparity in state
court retroactivity doctrines. 
272. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1052-54 (2008) (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).
273. Some hostility to the rule requiring exclusion of evidence, quite rational, is evident in
the Court’s own characterization of the consequence of its exclusion:
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the
guilty.  The disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of the rule is
contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice.
Stone, 428 U.S. at 490.  It would be difficult not to believe that state trial judges face a difficult
task in excluding evidence that results in the release of probably guilty defendants, at least in
cases involving serious crimes or acts of violence and that some state judges simply fail to apply
Supreme Court precedent faithfully, or as is more likely, simply accept improbable or incredible
testimony in order to reach determinations not requiring suppression of evidence.
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as a matter of state constitutional law is strained as the state court explains its
reasoning.  
This is not to suggest that state court decision-making is in any sense
disingenuous.  Instead, the burden placed upon state appellate courts is
inherently conflicting.  State courts are bound under the rationale of Michigan
v. Long to enforce federal constitutional protections and, consequently, to rule
on the merits of properly preserved federal constitutional claims.   When a274
claim is novel, or represents a novel application of existing federal
constitutional precedent, the state court is obligated to consider the claim and
rule on it as part of its role in the federalized judicial scheme.   When the275
disposition appears to exceed the scope of recognized federal constitutional
protections, however, the state attorney general will likely seek review of the
decision by certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.  And the Court, in
Michigan v. Long, has clearly reserved authority to resolve those questions.  276
Consequently, a state court is placed in the position of having to provide an
interpretation of the Federal Constitution, while at the same time recognizing
that its interpretation will presumptively be subject to scrutiny by the Court. 
When the state court expands upon existing precedent, no matter how
reasonably, the more conservative posture of the Court is likely to result in
reversal.
This situation is not inconsistent with the dual responsibilities imposed upon
state appellate courts for resolution of federal and state constitutional claims. 
But what it does suggest is that a state appellate court, having discerned an
understanding of the meaning of a federal constitutional protection later
discredited on certiorari by the Supreme Court, may be induced to apply that
same reasoning once the issue is subsequently presented and framed in terms
of state constitutional protections or state law.  The results may appear strained
because the state court essentially searches for a justification to validate its
rejected interpretation of the Federal Constitution in its holding under state
law.277
A classic example of this arguably strained interpretation is demonstrated
in the Michigan Supreme Court’s view of a mandatory life sentence, without
the possibility of parole, imposed for first-time offenders convicted of certain
274. 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-42 (1983).
275. Id. at 1042 n.8.
276. Id. at 1038-40.
277. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771 (2001) (reversing “[b]ecause the
Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision on rehearing is flatly contrary to this Court’s controlling
precedent . . . .”) and the subsequent decision in State v. Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d 215, 220-21 (Ark.
2002) (pretextual arrest illegal under article II, section fifteen of the Arkansas Constitution).
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drug trafficking offenses.   When the Michigan Court of Appeals  considered278
the constitutionality of the sentence mandated by the legislature, it found that
the sentence did not violate the “cruel and unusual” punishment provision of
the Eighth Amendment or the comparable provision of the state constitution.279
 The Supreme Court also rejected the Eighth Amendment  argument,280
deferring to the legislature’s judgment in proscribing sentences for serious
offenses in Harmelin v. Michigan.   Following the Court’s disposition in281
Harmelin, the state supreme court upheld a challenge to the sentencing scheme
in People v. Bullock,  this time predicating its holding on the state282
constitutional protection against imposition of “cruel or unusual
punishments.”   The court explained: “In the case of a divided United States283
Supreme Court decision, we may in some cases find more persuasive, and
choose to rely upon, the reasoning of the dissenting justices of that Court, and
not the majority, for purposes of interpreting our own Michigan
Constitution.”284
Interestingly, the Michigan court concluded that one rationale for
interpreting state constitutional provisions differently than the interpretation
of a comparable provision in the Federal Constitution by the United States
Supreme Court involves examination of the text itself.   Here, the state court285
noted that the phrasing of the state constitution in prohibiting “cruel or
unusual” punishments, as opposed to the language of the Eighth Amendment
prohibiting “cruel and unusual punishments,” offered a basis for distinguishing
278. People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1992). 
279. People v. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d 75 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).  The court rather summarily
held:
Defendant’s last claim is that the mandatory sentence of life in prison is entirely
out of proportion to the seriousness of his crime and constitutes a cruel and
unusual punishment proscribed by U.S. Const., Am. VIII, and Const. 1963, art. 1,
§ 16.  We disagree. 
Id. at 80.
280. The eighth amendment provides, in pertinent part: “nor cruel and unusual punishments
be imposed.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
281. 501 U.S. 957, 994-96 (1991).
282. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d at 872-76.
283. Id. at 870 n.8 (applying MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 16).
284. Id. at 870.
285. Id. at 872.  Differences of language in federal and state constitutional provisions
addressing comparable protections affords a basis for broader or more expansive protection of
rights under state constitutions than that recognized under the Federal Constitution.  See, e.g.,
State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 965 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring) (“A state constitution’s
language may itself provide a basis for reaching a different result from that which could be
obtained under federal law.”). 
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between the scope of protection contemplated by the two documents.  286
Moreover, the Bullock court noted its previous observation that the precise
language of the state constitutional provision suggested that some punishments
that are not necessarily cruel, such as incarceration, might still fall under the
prohibition for unusual punishments, such as an unusually oppressive length
of imprisonment.   This distinction is not irrational, but the question remains287
whether the authors of the state constitution and those electors ratifying it
actually understood there to be any distinction between the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment and the comparable provision of the Michigan
Constitution.
The Michigan court’s reliance on textual differences between the federal
and state constitutional provisions addressing punishments does not reflect any
particular flaw in analysis.  Nor does the expansive effect given the state
constitutional protection implicate any problem with lack of uniformity of
administration of federal constitutional law.  In fact, it may well achieve
precisely the opposite because in differentiating between the two sources of
protection, the state court has formally recognized the limitations placed upon
the application of federal constitutional law by the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the federal guarantee.  
However, in some real sense, the development of state constitutional law
doctrine as an alternative to Supreme Court interpretation of federal rights
imposes a lack of uniformity in terms of actual practice, based not only on the
protections afforded by the different constitutions, but their interpretation as
well.  The state courts are pressed into reevaluation of their constitutions
because they are prohibited from interpreting and applying federal
constitutional protections in any way that deviates from the Supreme Court’s
views. 
Or, the shifting views of the Supreme Court itself may lead state courts to
engage in assessment of the protections afforded by state constitutional
provisions.  For instance, in State v. Breit,  the New Mexico Supreme Court288
declined to follow the Supreme Court’s lead in Oregon v. Kennedy  in289
holding that a defense motion for mistrial waives a prior jeopardy claim except
when the defense is “goaded” into moving for mistrial by the prosecution’s
286. Id.  The court noted that in People v. Collins, 475 N.W.2d 684, 694 (Mich. 1991), it had
observed that a “‘significant textual difference[ ] between parallel provisions of the state and
federal constitutions’ may constitute a ‘compelling reason’ for a different and broader
interpretation of the state provision.”
287. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d at 872 (citing People v. Lorentzen, 194 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Mich.
1972)).
288. 930 P.2d 792 (N.M. 1996).
289. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
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misconduct.   Breit claimed prior jeopardy based on prosecutorial misconduct290
so extensive at his first trial that the trial court sustained his claim and granted
a new trial, then dismissed the case.   The state court of appeals reversed the291
dismissal on appeal by the State, and Breit was convicted at a second trial.  292
On appeal from his conviction and sentence of life imprisonment, the New
Mexico Supreme Court ruled that double jeopardy should have barred Breit’s
second trial.   The court noted that under Kennedy, Breit’s reprosecution293
would not have been barred.   But, the court also noted the pervasive294
misconduct by the prosecutor in the case so extensive that it declined to follow
the limitation imposed by the Supreme Court in Kennedy.295
Instead, the court noted that its prior formulation announced in State v.
Day  had been based upon Supreme Court decisions rendered prior to296
Kennedy, particularly United States v. Dinitz,  where the Court had297
condemned prosecutorial misconduct in far more aggressive terms.   The298
Breit court observed that the Supreme Court had referred to the prosecution’s
“gross negligence,” “misconduct,” “bad faith or malice,” “oppressive tactics,”
or strategies designed to “seriously prejudice and harass the defendant” as all
potentially warranting the imposition of the jeopardy bar to retrial.299
Rather than conform its view of double jeopardy to the more limited
approach of Kennedy, the Breit court found that Day continued to properly
express New Mexico law,  grounding its decision in the protection afforded300
by the state constitution.   It concluded that the Supreme Court had failed in301
Kennedy to properly assess the potential negative effects of misconduct when
the prosecutor’s subjective intent is not to provoke a mistrial motion.302
Instead, the court embraced Day, expressly holding:
Retrial is barred under Article II, Section 15, of the New Mexico
Constitution, when improper official conduct is so unfairly
290. Breit, 930 P.2d at 795 (citing Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 679).
291. Id. at 796 (recounting procedural history of case).
292. Id.  The New Mexico Supreme Court denied certiorari following the reversal and
remand ordered by the state court of appeals.  Breit v. State, 820 P.2d 435 (N.M. 1991).
293. Breit, 930 P.2d 792.
294. Id. at 796 (citing Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 679).
295. Id. at 804.
296. 617 P.2d 142, 146 (N.M. 1980).
297. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
298. Breit, 930 P.2d at 798 (citing Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 801 (citing Day, 617 P.2d at 146) (“Th[e Day] standard was an amalgam of
various pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court.”).
301. Id. at 803 (citing N.M. CONST. art. II, § 15).
302. Id. at 798, 801.
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prejudicial to the defendant that it cannot be cured by means short
of a mistrial or a motion for a new trial, and if the official knows
that the conduct is improper and prejudicial, and if the official
either intends to provoke a mistrial or acts in willful disregard of
the resulting mistrial, retrial, or reversal.303
Moreover, the court did not announce this approach in a vacuum, spending
considerable time in its opinion in noting the rejection of Kennedy by other
state courts.304
The Supreme Court’s refinement of existing doctrine or retreat from
positions previously held may thus lead to rejection of its more recent
pronouncements by state appellate courts resorting to state constitutional or
legal protections to maintain a jurisprudential status quo.  Looming on the
litigation horizon is the continuing viability of the federal exclusionary rule
itself.  When the Court adopted the “good faith” exception to the requirement
for exclusion of evidence seized in violation of Fourth Amendment privacy
protections,  a significant number of state courts refused to apply a similar305
exception to claims raised under state constitutional provisions,  or on306
statutory grounds.  307
The exclusionary rule has been subjected to repeated limitations by the
Court in recent years.  Initially the Court crafted the “good faith” exception in
United States v. Leon, which applies when an officer relies on the magistrate’s
error in issuing a search warrant in the absence of probable cause.   The308
Court subsequently held in Illinois v. Krull that a “good faith” reliance on a
statute declared unconstitutional justified an exception to the requirement for
exclusion of evidence.309
303. Id. at 803.
304. Id. at 798-800.
305. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
922 (1984).
306. For state courts rejecting a good faith exception on constitutional grounds see, e.g.,
State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58, 59 (Conn. 1990); Mason v. State, 534 A.2d 242, 254-55 (Del.
1987); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 677 (Idaho 1992); State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820,
856-57 (N.J. 1987); People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451, 458 (N.Y. 1985); State v. Carter, 370
S.E.2d 553, 554 (N.C. 1988); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 894 (Pa. 1991); State
v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119, 120-21 (Vt. 1991).
307. E.g., Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 422, 428-29 (Ga. 1992).
308. Leon, 468 U.S. at 925-26.
309. 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1987).
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More recently, in Michigan v. Hudson,  the Court rejected exclusion of310
evidence obtained on the basis of probable cause where the search of the home
was executed without properly knocking and announcing their presence and
purpose.  And finally, in Herring v. United States,  the Court extended the311
reach of the “good faith” except to the exclusionary rule where officers relied
on a previously withdrawn warrant as their basis for probable cause for the
search and arrest of the defendant.   The application of “good faith” on these312
facts would perhaps appear no more troubling to proponents of exclusion than
those in Leon, but the majority’s language certainly is.  The Herring Court
examined the legitimate purpose of exclusion, which in its view is the
deterrence of police illegality:
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be
sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and
sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by
the justice system.  As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule
serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct,
or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.  The
error in this case does not rise to that level.313
The suggestion implicit in the majority’s view is that once police officers
testify that they acted in good faith in conformity with their understanding of
probable cause, the burden will shift to the defense to rebut the claim of good
faith in order to establish that they, in fact, either acted with intent to violate
the defendant’s rights or were reckless or grossly negligent with regard to the
legal requirements for lawful searches or seizures.
State courts adopting the Herring formula will contribute to a non-uniform
application of Fourth Amendment law as individual trial judges will make
determinations based on their assessment of the credibility of officers pleading
“good faith” in their conduct of searches.  Moreover, officers may find it less
valuable to seek warrants because their ability to plead “good faith” will ease
the State’s burden of proving probable cause and exigent circumstances in the
absence of a warrant issued by a magistrate.314
310. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).  Justice Kennedy concurred in part and concurred in the judgment,
providing the fifth vote to uphold admission of the evidence.  Id. at 602 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
311. 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009).
312. Id. at 704.  The warrant had been recalled, but not removed from the active list as a
result of a clerical error.  Id. at 698.
313. Id. at 702 (emphasis added).
314. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984).
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State courts that have already rejected Leon’s “good faith” exception will
likely find the Herring majority’s limited rationale for exclusion equally
troubling.  For example, in State v. Gutierrez, the New Mexico court rejected
Leon, holding that protection of personal privacy, rather than deterrence of
police misconduct, is the core protection provided by the state constitution.  315
New Mexico courts have consistently held that the exclusionary rule is
essential for the protection of personal privacy,  serving to restore the parties316
to their respective positions had the illegal intrusion of privacy never
occurred.317
For jurisdictions like New Mexico, heavily invested in exclusion as an
ingrained component of state constitutional policy or state law,  the Court’s318
decision in Herring will likely be rejected.  The Court’s retreat from rigorous
and inclusive application of the exclusionary principle may well simply
enhance the divide between jurisdictions following its lead and those rejecting
it, again precipitating a lack of uniformity in the administration of the criminal
law.
The creative expansion of state constitutional doctrine by state appellate
courts, in some instances a direct response to shifting Supreme Court doctrine,
is a logical alternative for state judges interested in retaining more liberal
constructions of individual rights than those provided by the Court in
interpreting federal constitutional provisions.  It furthers the goal of a uniform
understanding of federal law, but it also promotes a far more complicated
matrix of constitutional doctrine for trial courts and practitioners, who must
work from multiple sources in assessing the proper scope of rights afforded
criminal defendants.  
All this is only to say that in practice, the goal of any true national
uniformity in criminal process is undermined by the inconsistent views of
procedural protections afforded defendants within the states.  The Chief
Justice’s plea for uniformity in federal law is straightforward in concept, but
Danforth’s recognition of state court autonomy in the retroactive application
of federally-defined rights is hardly significant in light of the realities of
practice in the state courts.  Unless there is evidence that state courts are
extending retroactive application of “new” constitutional criminal procedure
rules announced by the Supreme Court in an irrational fashion, Danforth
315. State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052, 1067-68 (1993) (citing N.M. CONST. art. II, § 10;
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984)).
316. See State v. Lujan, 175 P.3d 327, 329-32 {N.M. Ct. App. 2007);  State v. Wagoner, 24
P.3d 306 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Snyder, 967 P.2d 843, 844 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998). 
317. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d at 1067. 
318. See, e.g., State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 851 (noting that over twenty-five years,
the exclusionary rule had become “imbedded” in New Jersey’s jurisprudence).    
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represents but a minor deviation from the Chief Justice’s goal of a nationally
uniform application of federal law.
In fact, the Court has long recognized the unique approaches states may take
in regulating conduct through their criminal laws.  The Court recognized in
Patterson v. New York, for instance, that defining criminal offenses and
defenses is primarily the role of state legislatures.   There, the Court upheld319
a New York statute requiring a defendant attempting to rely on the lesser
offense of manslaughter as a defense to second degree murder to prove that he
acted under the influence of “severe emotional disturbance.”   But this mental320
element, according to the Court, which might establish the intent for a charged
offense of manslaughter under state law,  did not negate the mental state321
required for second degree murder, which required proof that the killing was
intentional.   In so holding, the Court distinguished New York’s statutory322
homicide scheme from Maine’s, where the Court had earlier held it violated
due process to require the accused to disprove justification for homicide or
suffer the effect of a presumption that his lack of proof established the mental
element required for a murder conviction.   The Court concluded that due323
process problems arose by improperly shifting the burden of proof for a
necessary element of the prosecution’s case to the defense.324
Patterson simply recognized that lack of uniformity in the legislative
determination of the elements of criminal offenses and defenses did not
necessarily offend any protection afforded by the Federal Constitution.   Still,325
the Chief Justice’s concern may readily be reconciled with Patterson’s
recognition of the autonomy of state legislatures in formulating local criminal
law, despite the fact that doing so will result in an uneven approach to
criminalization nationally.   In contrast, the protections afforded by the326
319. 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977).
320. Id. at 202, 205-06.
321. Id. at 199 n.3 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20(2) (McKinney 1975)).
322. Id. at 198 n.2, 205-08 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25).
323. Id. at 212-16 (citing Mullaney v. Wilber, 421 U.S. 684, 698-701 (1975)).
324. Id. (citing Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698-701). 
325. E.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 770-73, 779 (2006) (holding that Arizona was free
to exclude expert forensic evidence on defendant’s mental impairment unless offered in support
of insanity defense under state law).
326. Justice Stevens, the author of the majority opinion in Danforth, responded to Chief
Justice Roberts’s hypothetical problem of disparate dispositions:
[T]he dissent contends that the “end result [of this opinion] is startling” because
“two criminal defendants, each of whom committed the same crime, at the same
time, whose convictions became final on the same day, and each of whom raised
an identical claim at the same time under the Federal Constitution” could obtain
different results.  This assertion ignores the fact that the two hypothetical criminal
defendants did not actually commit the “same crime.”  They violated different
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Federal Constitution should be administered with regard to a national uniform
standard, and the Court’s jealous reservation of the right to be the ultimate and
only arbiter of federal constitutional questions in Michigan v. Long certainly
furthers that goal.
c) The Non-Uniformity Imposed in Federal Habeas
Third, and perhaps most importantly, it is not clear that there exists any real
consensus that a uniform national application—as opposed to
interpretation—of federal constitutional law is an important part of
constitutional policy.  This is evident in Congress’s treatment of state court
application of Supreme Court precedent when reviewed in the federal habeas
process.  State court defendants are permitted to challenge their convictions
based on claims of federal constitutional error through federal habeas
proceedings brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.   This has traditionally327
been a significant avenue for relief.  For example, in Reed v. Quarterman,328
the Fifth Circuit recently granted relief in federal habeas, ordering a new trial
for a Texas inmate who had spent thirty years on death row based on his claim
that prosecutors had discriminatorily removed minority jurors through exercise
of their peremptory challenges during the selection of his capital trial jury.  329
However, the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA)  resulted in a significant restriction on the authority of330
state laws, were tried in and by different state sovereigns, and may–for many
reasons–be subject to different penalties. As previously noted, such nonuniformity
is a necessary consequence of a federalist system of government.
Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1047 (2008) (citation omitted).
327. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006).  The section provides that relief may be afforded a “person
in custody of pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”  Id.
328. 555 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 2009).
329. Id. at 380.  The circuit court held that the State’s proffered explanations for its exercise
of strikes against two black venirepersons were unsupported by the record of voir dire and
constituted “mere pretexts for discrimination.”  Id.  The use of peremptory challenges to
exclude otherwise qualified jurors from service based on race, ethnicity or gender violates the
Fourteenth Amendment.  J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135, 137 n.6 (1994);
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986).  The Reed court noted that the claim had been
preserved prior to the Court’s announcement of Batson in 1986, but rejected by the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals in his direct appeal.  Reed, 555 F.3d at 368-70, 373.  Under the Supreme
Court’s decision in Griffith, the preservation of his claim remained viable throughout the direct
appeal process and, thus, he was entitled to rely on Batson when it was announced during the
pendency of his appeal in state court.  Reed, 555 F.3d 364 (citing Griffith, 479 U.S. 314, 321
n.6).  
330. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 19, 21, 22,
28, 42, & 49 U.S.C.).
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federal habeas courts under § 2254.   The amended statute provides, in §331
2254(d)(1), that a federal habeas court can only grant relief on a claim of legal
error where a state court disposition “resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”332
The requirement that the state court decision challenged be “contrary to,”
or that it “involve an unreasonable application of” Supreme Court precedent
is particularly important because it not only prevents federal habeas courts
from formulating new rules  or applying existing rules in new ways, but also333
prevents those courts from correcting erroneous state court decisions.   Thus,334
state court decisions that misinterpret Supreme Court precedent, but do so
reasonably, are insulated from attack in the federal habeas process.  335
Similarly, incorrect interpretations of constitutional law that do not directly
contravene Supreme Court precedent are not subject to correction by federal
habeas courts, which would functionally be supplying constitutional
interpretation in so doing.   336
331. For an informative perspective on the passage of AEDPA, see John H. Blume, AEDPA:
The “Hype” and the “Bite”, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 269-70 (2006) (noting the Court itself
had severely restricted availability of habeas relief by decisions rendered during roughly two
decades preceding passage of AEDPA, which the author argues was made possible by convicted
Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building bomber Timothy McVeigh). 
332. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  For cases construing “contrary to” and “unreasonable
application” of existing Supreme Court precedent, see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520
(2003), and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-408 (2000). 
XXA federal habeas court can also grant relief on a claim that a state court disposition “resulted
in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).  However, as the
Reed court observed, state court factual findings are presumed correct in the federal habeas
process unless rebutted by “clear and convincing evidence” under section 2254(e)(1).  Reed,
555 F.3d at 368 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). 
333. See, e.g., Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 120-21 (1995) (per curiam) (citing Teague
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (plurality opinion), for the principle that federal habeas
courts cannot announce new rules of constitutional criminal procedure).
334. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000) (“Under § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable
application’ clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court
concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly
established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.  Rather, that application must also be
unreasonable.”).  For a thoroughly intellectual discussion of federal habeas decisionmaking
predicated on interpretation and application of subsection (d)(1), see Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s
Wrecks: Comity, Finality and Federalism, 82 TULANE L REV. 443, 488-502 (2007) (noting the
difference in assessing reasonableness of a state court decision objectively and reviewing the
rationale by which the state court reached its conclusion).
335. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
336. See id.
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The effect of the deferential approach imposed on federal habeas courts by
Congress in amending § 2254 to require federal habeas court deference to state
court legal interpretations has been dramatic precisely because state court
dispositions of federal constitutional claims are not subject to correction unless
the “contrary to” or “unreasonable application” standards are met.  The impact
of the AEDPA amendment is demonstrated by an Arkansas case again raising
the question of cruel and unusual punishment.  The Eighth Circuit found that
the life sentence imposed by an Arkansas jury for a first time offender
convicted of selling less than one-quarter gram of cocaine (an amount less than
the weight of a paper clip) constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
Henderson v. Norris.337
In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision
in Harmelin v. Michigan, in which the Court held that imposition of a life
sentence without parole for a first-time offender convicted of possessing a
substantial quantity of controlled substances with intent to distribute did not
offend the Eighth Amendment.   The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld338
Henderson’s conviction and sentence on a 4-3 vote.   Prior to the amendment339
of the federal habeas statute in the AEDPA, effective April 24, 1996,  federal340
habeas courts did not have to defer to reasonable, but incorrect, decisions of
state courts.   Henderson filed his federal habeas action prior to the effective341
date of AEDPA,  and consequently, the circuit court was not restricted in342
concluding that his sentence was cruel and unusual, even in light of the
recognition of broad state power in setting punishments by the Harmelin
Court.   Under AEDPA, however, the state court’s ruling would not have343
been unreasonable, nor contrary to the decision in Harmelin, and Henderson’s
life sentence would not have been vacated.
Further, in terms of uniformity of administration of federal constitutional
law, the Court itself has seemingly undermined uniformity in the application
of federal constitutional protections in the federal habeas process.
For example, in Stone v. Powell, the Court generally excluded claimed
violations of Fourth Amendment privacy protection from review in federal
habeas corpus, unless the petitioner could show that the state courts had not
337. 258 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2001). 
338. Id. (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)).
339. Henderson v. State, 910 S.W.2d 1056 (Ark. 1995).  
340. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 19, 21, 22,
28, 42, & 49 U.S.C.).
341. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 323-33 (1997) (holding that federal habeas
petitions pending on April 24, 1996, the effective date of the Act, were not governed by the
provisions of AEDPA.
342. Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d at 707.
343. Id. at 712-14 (discussing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005).
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afforded him an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the search and seizure
claim in state proceedings.   The decision effectively promotes some degree344
of lack of uniformity in administration of Fourth Amendment protections
because it insulates most state court holdings resting on factual determinations
from federal habeas review.   But it also has the effect of insulating state345
court application of Supreme Court legal precedent in this area from review for
legal error.  The majority apparently accepted this possibility, while dismissing
its significance in reaching its decision.
The Court noted two important policy considerations in holding that Fourth
Amendment claims would generally not be subject to relitigation in federal
habeas.  First, the majority observed that exclusion of probative evidence
entails significant social costs because the excluded evidence is typically
reliable and often the most critical evidence in establishing the accused’s
guilt.   Second, the majority found that the deterrent effect of the346
exclusionary rule would not be significantly improved as a result of the
prospect for relitigation in federal habeas.   Justice Powell, writing for the347
majority, also dismissed criticism that suggested that state courts would not
properly apply Fourth Amendment precedents once the accused’s option of re-
litigating search and seizure claims in federal habeas was generally barred.348
However, excluding a significantly large class of federal constitutional
claims from review in federal habeas corpus effectively insulates state court
interpretation and application of federal constitutional precedent from review
other than by certiorari.  This is not to suggest that the Court does not continue
to engage in active interpretation of Fourth Amendment values,  but given349
the limitations imposed on the Court by sheer numbers and the relatively small
number of cases afforded review,  the effect of Stone v. Powell is to accept350
344. 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
345. See supra notes 268-71 and accompanying text.
346. Stone, 428 U.S. at 489-90.  The Court stated, “Application of the rule thus deflects the
truthfinding process and often frees the guilty.”  Id. at 490.
347. Id. at 493-94.
348. Id. at 493 n.35.  Justice Powell concluded:
Despite differences in institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude to
federal constitutional claims of some state judges in years past, we are unwilling
to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to
constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States. State
courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal
liberties and to uphold federal law.
Id.
349. E.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006) (holding that co-occupant’s
express refusal to consent to search of residence in person must be honored by law enforcement
officers despite co-occupant spouse’s consent). 
350. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 460 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Since
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the likelihood that federal constitutional protections will not be uniformly
applied in the Fourth Amendment context. 
In a similar vein, the Court’s imposition of a burden of proof of probable
prejudice upon federal habeas petitioners claiming that their state court
convictions were tainted by violations of their constitutional rights results in
some necessary lack of uniformity in the application of federal constitutional
protections.  The standard for proof of probable prejudice is greater for the
inmate/petitioner than if the same claim of violation has been addressed
properly on direct appeal in the state courts.
When a state court reviews a federal constitutional claim on direct appeal,
it must apply the harmlessness standard of Chapman v. California.   Under351
Chapman, the burden is placed on the prosecution to demonstrate that
constitutional trial error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in order to
avoid reversal.   In Brecht v. Abrahamson,  however, the Court held that352 353
when that same error is recognized by the federal habeas court, the petitioner
is not entitled to relief unless he can also establish that “the error ‘had a
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict’”
such that it resulted in “‘actual prejudice.’”   When the federal habeas court354
is in “grave doubt” as to whether the prejudice standard has been met, the
petitioner is entitled to relief.355
In Brecht, the Court rejected the argument that the more difficult burden of
obtaining relief on federal constitutional claims in the habeas process might
lead some state courts to simply fail to apply Chapman rigorously, assured that
relief would be less likely once these claims surfaced in the federal courts.  356
the majority is as aware of the limits of our capacity as I am, there is little fear that the grant of
certiorari in a case of this sort will often be repeated–which is to say little fear that today’s grant
has any generalizable principle behind it.”). 
351. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
352. Id. at 24.
353. 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
354. Id. at 637 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).  The
Kotteakos test is applied for review of non-constitutional error on direct appeal in federal cases. 
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65.
355. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437 (1995).
356. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 636.  Chief Justice Rehnquist responded to this argument:
Petitioner argues that application of the Chapman harmless-error standard on
collateral review is necessary to deter state courts from relaxing their own guard
in reviewing constitutional error and to discourage prosecutors from committing
error in the first place. Absent affirmative evidence that state-court judges are
ignoring their oath, we discount petitioner’s argument that courts will respond to
our ruling by violating their Article VI duty to uphold the Constitution.
Id.  Of course, if Chief Justice Rehnquist was correct, there would have been little need for
legislation creating the federal habeas remedy for state court defendants.
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But in fact, the application of the Brecht standard in numerous cases
demonstrates that, whether intentional or not, state courts failed to vigorously
enforce constitutional protections.  The Eighth Circuit alone took the position
that if state courts failed to recognize federal constitutional claims and apply
the Chapman standard in their review, the Chapman harmlessness test should
be applied when the same claims were shown to be meritorious in the federal
habeas process.   However, the Supreme Court recently rejected this357
approach in a case arising in the Ninth Circuit, Fry v. Pliler, holding that the
Brecht prejudice standard applies in all federal habeas proceedings.358
The statutory requirement for deference to state court interpretation or
application of federal constitutional precedent and the Court’s imposition of
a prejudice requirement for proof of a constitutional violation warranting
federal habeas relief in Brecht both implicate a lack of concern for uniformity
in the interpretation and application of federal constitutional law.  If uniformity
were truly a paramount national and constitutional policy, it seems doubtful
that enforcement of federal constitutional guarantees would be compromised
by legislative and judicial policy alternatives limiting the authority of federal
habeas courts reviewing state court convictions.
3. The Prospects for Greater State Court Autonomy After Danforth
Notwithstanding the theoretical significance of Chief Justice Roberts’s
concern that Danforth will promote a lack of uniformity in the administration
of federal constitutional law, pre-Danforth action by state courts suggests that
the impact may be less problematic than the Chief Justice foresees. 
Admittedly, prior to Danforth, some state courts had anticipated its holding
that Teague does not bar retroactive application of federal constitutional
decisions when retroactive application would be authorized as a matter of state
law.   These rulings present the possibility of differential treatment of359
357. Orndorff v. Lockhart, 998 F.2d 1426, 1429-30 (8th Cir. 1993).
358. Fry v. Pliler, 127 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (2007).
359. E.g., Smart v. State, 146 P.3d 15, 25 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006) (“State courts remain free
to reach the merits of a prisoner’s federal constitutional claim even when federal habeas corpus
relief would be barred because of Teague.”); Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d. 400, 408-09 (Fla.
2005) (“[S]tate courts are not bound by Teague in determining retroactivity of decisions. . . . 
We continue to apply our longstanding Witt analysis, which provides more expansive
retroactivity standards than those adopted in Teague.”) (citation omitted); Figarola v. State, 841
So. 2d 576, 577 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (“Teague is not binding on state courts when they
are determining if their own decisions are retroactive.”) (citing Mary C. Hutton, Retroactivity
in the States: The Impact of Teague v. Lane on State Postconviction Remedies, 44 ALA. L. REV.
421. 457 (1993)); State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W. 253, 267 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (“It is up to each
state to determine whether to apply the rule set out in Teague . . . .  So long as the state’s test
is not narrower than that set forth in Teague, it will pass constitutional muster.”); Colwell v.
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similarly situated petitioners in different states.  Significantly, however, a
number of states had already deferred to Teague as controlling, concluding
themselves barred from affording relief to state court defendants petitioning
for postconviction relief in state proceedings on the basis of Supreme Court
decisions announcing new rules of constitutional criminal procedure.  360
Another group of states, moreover, had adopted Teague as the formula for
retroactivity analysis under state law, despite conceding that Teague does not
bind state courts.   A third group of state courts had anticipated the decision361
in Danforth in holding that Teague does not bar retroactive application of
federal constitutional decisions when retroactive application would be
authorized as a matter of state law.362
State, 59 P.3d 463, 470-71 (Nev. 2002) (“Teague is not controlling on this court, other than in
the minimum constitutional protections established by its two exceptions.  In other words, we
may choose to provide broader retroactive application of new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure than Teague and its progeny require.”); State v. Fair, 502 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Or. 1972)
(en banc) (“[W]e are free to choose the degree of retroactivity or prospectivity which we believe
appropriate to the particular rule under consideration, so long as we give federal constitutional
rights at least as broad a scope as the United States Supreme Court requires.”); Cowell v.
Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514, 517 (S.D. 1990) (“The federal government controls how it permits
access to [habeus corpus] in its courts, and South Dakota establishes grounds that will provide
access to habeas corpus in our courts.”); State v. Evans, 114 P.3d 627, 633 (Wash. 2005) (en
banc) (“There may be a case where our state statute would authorize or require retroactive
application of a new rule of law when Teague would not. . . .  As Chief Justice Rehnquist sagely
noted, Teague was ‘grounded in important considerations of federal-state relations.’”) (quoting
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990)); see also Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837, 847-
48 (Fla. 2005); State v. Lark, 567 A.2d 197, 203 (N.J. 1989).
360. E.g., Page v. Palmateer, 84 P.3d 133, 137-38 (Or. 2004) (“[State courts are not] free to
determine the degree to which a new rule of federal constitutional law should be applied
retroactively . . . .”); see also Johnson v. Warden, 591 A.2d 407, 410 (Conn. 1991); Whisler v.
State, 36 P.3d 290, 296 (Kan. 2001); State v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 267 (Mont. 1995), rev’d
on other grounds, 518 U.S. 37 (1996); People v. Eastman, 648 N.E.2d 459, 464-65 (N.Y. 1995);
Agee v. Russell, 751 N.E.2d 1043, 1046-47 (Ohio 2001); Thomas v. State, 1994 OK CR 85, ¶
13, 888 P.2d 522, 527; Commonwealth v. Hughes, 865 A.2d 761, 780-81 (Pa. 2004).
361. E.g., Edwards v. People, 129 P.3d 977, 981-82 (Colo. 2006) (en banc) (recognizing the
possibility that Teague does not bind the states, then circumventing the problem by deciding,
as a matter of state law, to adopt the Teague rule); see also People v. Flowers, 561 N.E.2d 674,
682 (Ill. 1990) (adopting Teague as a matter of state law); State v. Mohler, 694 N.E.2d 1129,
1132 (Ind. 1998); Daniels v. State, 561 N.E.2d 487, 489 (Ind. 1990); Brewer v. State, 444
N.W.2d 77, 81 (Iowa 1989); State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292, 1296-97 (La.
1992), cert. denied 508 U.S. 962 (1993); State v. Tallard, 816 A.2d 977, 979-81 (N.H. 2003)
(recognizing the possibility that Teague did not bind the states, then circumventing the problem
by deciding, as a matter of state law, to apply the Teague rule).
362. E.g., Smart v. State, 146 P.3d 15, 25 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006); Johnson v. State, 904 So.
2d 400, 408-09 (Fla. 2005); Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837, 839-48 (Fla. 2004); State v.
Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 266-68 (Mo. 2003) (“It is up to each state to determine whether to
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For many jurisdictions, then, Teague clearly expressed at least a preferred,
if not mandatory, retroactivity policy even before Danforth.  In the wake of
Danforth, therefore, the retroactivity question might now be considered as a
matter of state constitutional or procedural law in which state courts are free
to apply federal constitutional principles in conformity with their normal
schemes for retroactivity determination, even when those decisions are not
predicated on state constitutional protections.   Thus, Kansas and other states363
filing as amici in Danforth couched their interest in the case in this way: “The
fundamental question in this case—whether the Constitution dictates the
procedures, substance and remedies the States must provide in post-conviction
actions—goes to the very heart of federalism.”   Danforth validates that364
posture.
It is not clear, however, that Danforth will dramatically alter the approach
already taken by many jurisdictions in considering how to administer their
post-conviction retroactivity rules.  It is clear that Teague does not control the
retroactive application of federal constitutional decisions after Danforth, and
also does not bear on state retroactivity doctrine with regard to application of
“new” rules of state constitutional or state law origin in the state post-
conviction process.   The significance of the latter proposition lies in the365
apply the rule set out in Teague, [or] to continue to apply the rule set out in Linkletter . . . or to
apply yet some other rule appropriate for determining [the] retroactivity of a new constitutional
rule to cases on collateral review.  So long as the state’s test is not narrower than that set forth
in Teague, it will pass constitutional muster.”); Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 470-71 (Nev.
2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 981 (2003); State v. Lark, 567 A.2d 197, 203 (N.J. 1989); State
v. Fair, 502 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Or. 1972); Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514, 517-18 (S.D.
1990); State v. Evans, 114 P.3d 627, 633 (Wash. 2005) (noting that Teague is ultimately
“‘grounded in important considerations of federal-state relations,’” and holding that “[t]here
may be a case where our state statute would authorize or require retroactive application of a new
rule of law when Teague would not.”).  In Figarola v. State, 841 So. 2d 576 (Fla. App. 2003),
the court observed:
Some states have adopted Teague without discussing the fact that Teague is not
binding on state courts when they are determining if their own decisions are
retroactive. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Teague reflected that court’s
narrowing view of the rule of federal habeas corpus. The policy considerations
behind Teague are not necessarily the same as those for state court post-conviction
relief.
Id. at 577 n.1 (relying on Hutton, supra note 359, at 457).
363. See Laura Denvir Stith, A Contrast of State and Federal Court Authority to Grant
Habeas Relief, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 438-49 (2004) (discussing state court authority to
expand upon federal retroactivity principles in extending relief to state court habeas petitioners
relying on new rules announced by United States Supreme Court).
364. See Brief of Kansas and the Amici States in Support of Neither Party, Danforth v.
Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008) (No. 06-8273), 2007 WL 2088650, at *1.
365. See, e.g., State v. Jess, 184 P.3d 133, 154 n.20 (Haw. 2008) (“We do not believe that
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development of state constitutions and alternative theories for relief under state
process that have characterized the increasing role of state appellate courts in
articulating procedural rights accorded criminal defendants in their respective
courts.
Thus, Teague might be viewed in different ways by state courts considering
retroactivity after Danforth.  State courts might simply view Teague as a wise
policy approach in limiting retroactive application of new rules of
constitutional criminal procedure announced by the United States Supreme
Court.  Or, in a broader sense, Teague might provide a framework for
retroactivity determinations for new rules or interpretations of state law,
including state constitutional provisions.  Or, as the Nevada Supreme Court
held in Colwell v. State, Teague might provide a framework for retroactivity,
while the court reserves to itself the option of broadening the Teague
exceptions when necessary to address significant constitutional deprivations.  366
For instance, the Colwell court criticized the extremely narrow scope of the
second exception, which requires retroactive application of watershed rules of
criminal procedure.  Instead, the court concluded that the thrust of the
exception should be whether the likelihood that a conviction has been
wrongfully imposed would be “seriously diminished” by retroactive
application of a new rule.367
State courts have not, in fact, been held bound to retroactively apply new
rules arising in the context of state law as a matter of federal due process.  368
either Danforth or Teague is particularly germane to our analysis regarding whether the new
charging rule that we announce today should apply retroactively, because the rule is grounded
not in the United States Constitution but, rather, in article I, sections 5 and 10 of the Hawai’i
Constitution. . . .  Therefore, we are guided by our own independent state law jurisprudence in
determining whether the rule applies retroactively.”).
366. Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 470-72 (Nev. 2002).
367. Id. at 471-72.
368. See, e.g., Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 955-56 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
Griffith v. Kentucky does not require retroactive application by state courts of new rules or
constructions of state law, even to cases pending on direct appeal at the time of announcement
of the new rule); Mason v. Duckworth, 74 F.3d 815, 818-19 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding newly
adopted evidentiary rule in Indiana did not apply retroactively); Lackey v. Scott, 28 F.3d 486,
491 (5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting due process argument that announcement of a new rule relating
to definition of “reasonable doubt” in Texas trials and given prospective effect by state court
because the new rule is not a federal constitutional requirement requiring retroactive application
(citing Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994)); Diggs v. Owens, 833 F.2d 439, 442 (3d Cir.
1987) (holding “Griffith should be confined to constitutional rules of criminal procedure and
thus does not require retroactive application of new procedural decisions not constitutionally
grounded.”); People v. Erickson, 513 N.E.2d 367, 374-75 (Ill. 1987) (declining retroactive
application of rule prohibiting questioning of jurors concerning death penalty when jury
sentencing waived prior to trial); Commonwealth v. Waters, 511 N.E.2d 356, 357 (Mass. 1987)
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One viable argument for state court autonomy in formulation and application
of retroactivity doctrine focuses on the desirability of states to apply new rules
consistently regardless of whether the rules flow from federal constitutional
guarantees, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, or the
construction of state constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules.  As opposed
to uniformity in terms of retroactive application of new federal constitutional
rules, this approach would recognize the desirability of permitting each
jurisdiction to formulate a policy of uniformity so that all state court
defendants would be treated equally.  To the extent that Teague provides a
retroactivity model for state court decisions resting on adequate and
independent state law grounds, rather than federal constitutional grounds, it
may afford direction for state courts.  It does not, however, mandate
retroactivity policy consistent with Teague’s retroactivity doctrine for
application of “new” rules of federal constitutional criminal procedure.
Perhaps more importantly, the substantial number of jurisdictions reporting
rejection of the Teague retroactivity doctrine in state post-conviction litigation,
demonstrated no significant harm to federal constitutional doctrine offered by
Chief Justice Roberts in support of his dissenting position in Danforth.  The
pre-Danforth declarations of independence from Teague in these jurisdictions
has apparently not been translated into any demonstrably adverse
consequences to the overall administration of federal constitutional criminal
procedure, suggesting that the criminal justice system is neither unable to
accommodate flexibility in retroactivity, nor paralyzed by uncertainty of
federal constitutional criminal procedure at all.
V. Application of Danforth, Prospectively
The Danforth Court rejected the argument that Teague circumscribed all
state court retroactivity discretion.  The significance of this conclusion lies
practically in the question of whether state inmates—whose convictions were
final at the time a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure was
announced—can benefit from those rules.  But, theoretically, it lies in
questions of state autonomy in formulating retroactivity doctrine based on the
traditions of an individual jurisdiction.
(new rule from Commonwealth v. Allen, 480 N.E.2d 630, 636 (Mass. 1985), requiring trial court
to make voluntariness inquiry when accused confesses to private citizen not applied
retroactively because rule not based on federal constitutional requirement); People v. Sexton,
580 N.W.2d 404, 410-11 (Mich. 1998); State v. Abronski, 678 A.2d 659, 660 (N.J. 1996) (new
rule requiring police to inform arrestees of presence of counsel applied prospectively only). 
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At the outset, it is important to note that Danforth, while prevailing on his
claim that Minnesota could apply Crawford retroactively in his case,  found369
that on remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to do so.   The court370
had previously opted for a retroactivity doctrine consistent with Teague in
O’Meara v. State,  and followed in State v. Houston.   Considering the371 372
Court’s holding, the state supreme court observed: “States may follow Teague
if they wish, but states may also choose to apply a broader retroactivity
standard than stated in Teague. . . .  Thus, we may elect to retain the Teague
standard even for non-federal cases, or we may determine retroactivity by a
different standard of our choosing.”   Considering the options of returning to373
its prior reliance on the Linkletter/Stovall retroactivity doctrine or fashioning
a more flexible approach, the court ultimately concluded that Teague
represented the preferable option.   It thus elected to follow a course374
circumscribed by Teague and denied relief on Danforth’s confrontation
claim.375
Now unconstrained by the Court’s holding in Danforth, other state courts
might consider a range of alternative approaches to retroactivity, including
reliance on the Linkletter approach, or others, as explained by the New Jersey 
369. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1033 (2008).
370. Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 499 (Minn. 2009) (adopting Teague as “preferable
rule to alternatives”); see also Ex parte Lave, 257 S.W.3d 235, 237 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
(adhering to pre-Danforth decision in Ex parte Keith, 202 S.W.3d 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)
in rejecting retroactive application of Crawford following Danforth).  In People v. McDowell,
No. 07CA1358, 2009 WL 540665 (Colo. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2009), the Colorado court rejected
the post-conviction petitioner’s argument for retroactive application of Missouri v. Siebert, 542
U.S. 600, 609 (2004), arguing that Siebert required suppression of a statement given pursuant
to a confession technique rejected by the Court as unconstitutional.  The state trial court and
court of appeals both held that Siebert does not apply retroactively.  McDowell, 2009 WL
540665, at *1.  The court of appeals found that Siebert did not constitute a “watershed” rule of
criminal procedure to be applied retroactively under the second exception to the Teague non-
retroactivity doctrine.  Id. at *6.
XXThe petitioner argued, however, that Colorado could apply Siebert retroactively in light of
the Court’s holding in Danforth.  Id.  Acknowledging Danforth, the Colorado court nevertheless
declined to consider retroactive application in light of Edwards v. People, 129 P.3d 977, 982-83
(Colo. 2006), where the Colorado Supreme Court had previously held that the state conforms
its retroactivity doctrine to the limitations imposed by Teague.  McDowell, 2009 WL 540665,
at *5-6.  
371. 679 N.W.2d 334, 339 (Minn. 2004), abrogated as recognized in Danforth v. State, 761
N.W.2d 334.
372. 702 N.W.2d 268, 270 (Minn. 2005).
373. Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d at 497.
374. Id. at 498.
375. Id. at 499.
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Supreme Court.  That court has observed that with regard to retroactive
application of new rules of criminal procedure:
[W]e note that this Court has four options open to it in any decision
involving retroactivity: (1) make the new rule of law purely
prospective, applying it only to cases whose operative facts arise
after the new rule is announced; (2) apply the new rule to future
cases and to the parties in the case announcing the new rule, while
applying the old rule to all other pending and past litigation; (3)
grant the new rule limited retroactivity, applying it to cases in (1)
and (2) as well as to pending cases where the parties have not yet
exhausted all avenues of direct review; and, finally, (4) give the
new rule complete retroactive effect, applying it to all cases, even
those where final judgments have been entered and all avenues of
direct review exhausted.376
The first option discussed by the court denies even the successful litigant the
benefit of the new rule announced, but in so doing, does not penalize the
prosecutor who relied on an existing rule in trying the case.  The second option
benefits the individual litigant successfully arguing for a change in the law, but
fails to reward those litigants raising identical issues as those resulting in the
announcement of the new rule.  The third option basically anticipated the
Court’s approach in Griffith,  extending the benefit of a new rule to all377
litigants whose preserved claims of error are still pending on direct appeal
when the rule is announced.  The fourth approach affords full retroactivity,
clearly inconsistent with the constitutional requirement for retroactive
application announced in Teague.378
A. The New Mexico Supreme Court’s Approach in Earnest
The New Mexico Supreme Court afforded retroactive application of
Crawford to a state court defendant prior to the disposition of the retroactivity
issue in Whorton v. Bockting and the Court’s decision in Danforth.  The
defendant, Earnest, was convicted of capital murder on the uncrossed
confession given to police by Boeglin, who admitted participation in the
crime.   On direct appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed, holding379
376. State v. Burstein, 427 A.2d 525, 529 (N.J. 1981); see also State v. Lark, 567 A.2d 197,
201 (N.J. 1989); State v. Nash, 317 A.2d 689, 691-92 (N.J. 1974).
377. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1987).
378. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307-08 (1989).
379. State v. Earnest, 703 P.2d 872, 874 (N.M. 1985) (Earnest I).  Boeglin was later
convicted of capital murder when jurors rejected his claim that his participation in the capital
murder was the product of duress.  State v. Boeglin, 731 P.2d 943, 949-50 (N.M. 1987). 
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that admission of Boeglin’s statement in the absence of any opportunity for the
defense to test the credibility of Boeglin’s claims by cross-examination
violated Earnest’s Sixth Amendment confrontation right,  relying on the380
Supreme Court’s decision in Douglas v. Alabama.   381
The Court granted the state’s petition for certiorari, however, and vacated
the judgment reversing Earnest’s conviction and remanded for
reconsideration  in light of its intervening decision in Lee v. Illinois.   In382 383
Lee, the Court had extended the rationale of Ohio v. Roberts authorizing
admission of uncrossed hearsay that bears “sufficient indicia of reliability” to
warrant admission even in the absence of a meaningful opportunity for cross-
examination by the accused.   However, the Lee Court had reversed Lee’s384
conviction, finding that the admission of her accomplice’s statement had
violated her confrontation rights, noting that the statements given by
accomplices to the police have traditionally been characterized as “inherently
suspect.”385
On remand from the Supreme Court, the New Mexico court followed then-
Associate Justice Rehnquist’s suggestion in his concurrence to the remand
order that state courts could admit statements of nontestifying codefendants
assuming that the prosecution could overcome the “weighty presumption of
unreliability attaching” to those statements by demonstrating that the particular
statement at issue bears sufficient “indicia of reliability” to satisfy
Confrontation Clause concerns.   On remand, the state court held that386
Boeglin’s confession did bear sufficient indicia of reliability as a declaration
against his penal interest to warrant its admission despite the lack of cross-
380. Earnest I, 703 P.2d at 875.  The court concluded:
[B]oeglin’s prior statement made to police officers shortly after his arrest was not
made during the course of any judicial proceeding and defendant was in no way
afforded an opportunity to cross-examine Boeglin.  We therefore determine that
admission of Boeglin’s prior statement was highly prejudicial, violated
defendant’s confrontation rights, and deprived defendant of meaningful cross-
examination.
Id.
381. 380 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1965).
382. New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648, 649 (1986) (per curiam).
383. 476 U.S. 530 (1986). 
384. Id. at 543 (discussing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980)).
385. Id. at 54; see also Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 131 (1999) (noting the “presumptive
unreliability of the ‘non-self-inculpatory’ portions” of an accomplice’s statement); Cruz v. New
York, 481 U.S. 186, 195 (1987) (White, J., dissenting) (such statements “have traditionally been
viewed with special suspicion”); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.  123, 136 (1968) (such
statements are “inevitably suspect”).
386. State v. Earnest, 744 P.2d 539, 540 (N.M. 1987) (discussing New Mexico v. Earnest,
477 U.S. at 649-50 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
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examination, and the court affirmed Earnest’s conviction.   Earnest then387
pursued a federal habeas action attacking his conviction, but was unsuccessful
because the federal district and circuit courts credited the state court’s analysis
with respect to the reliability of Boeglin’s confession.388
Nine years later, the Court’s decision in Crawford suggested the possibility
for retroactive application of its holding and the potential for relief for
defendants convicted on the basis of accomplice confessions made to police
and not tested by cross-examination at trial.  Earnest petitioned for state post-
conviction relief in the New Mexico trial court.   He argued that because the389
Court in Crawford had admitted that its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence
had essentially taken an incorrect turn in Ohio v. Roberts,  he had been390
improperly denied his reliance on Douglas v. Alabama that initially resulted
in reversal of his conviction.   The New Mexico trial court agreed with391
Earnest and ordered relief on his petition.392
The state supreme court upheld the trial court’s grant of habeas corpus in
State v. Forbes,  an original action on the application for writ of393
superintending control filed by the Attorney General challenging the trial
court’s action ordering Earnest’s release.   The court noted that it had394
originally rejected Ohio v. Roberts as controlling authority when Earnest’s
conviction was initially reversed based on Sixth Amendment confrontation
387. Id.
388. Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, Earnest v. Dorsey,
519 U.S. 1016 (1996).  Initially, the Earnest I court relied on the Tenth Circuit’s application of
Roberts in United States v. Rothbart, 653 F.2d 462, 465 (10th Cir. 1981), limiting the
application of the Roberts rationale to instances in which the prosecution offered prior
testimony that had been subjected to cross-examination, a formulation correctly anticipating
Crawford.  Earnest I, 703 P.2d 872, 876 (N.M. 1985).  Following the Supreme Court’s order
remanding, the Tenth Circuit, possibly influenced by Justice Rehnquist’s observations,
expanded its view of the applicability of the Roberts formulation to include admission of
uncrossed statements of accomplices, like Boeglin.  Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d at 1131-34.
389. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Earnest v. State, No. CR-82-54 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Oct.
1, 2004); see N.M. R. ANN. 5-8026, Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts.
390. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004) (“[W]e view this as one of those rare
cases in which the result below is so improbable that it reveals a fundamental failure on our part
to interpret the Constitution in a way that secures its intended constraint on judicial discretion.”
(emphasis added)).
391. Earnest I, 703 P.2d at 875. 
392. State v. Earnest, No. 82-54 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Feb. 11, 2005 (order granting writ of habeas
corpus); State v. Earnest, No. CR-82-54 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Jan. 1, 2005) (decision of district court
holding that writ of habeas corpus should be granted).
393. State v. Forbes, 119 P.3d 144, 145 (N.M. 2005), cert. denied, New Mexico v. Forbes,
549 U.S. 1274 (2007).
394. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss3/1
2008] DANFORTH, RETROACTIVITY, AND FEDERALISM 491
grounds.   It then explained that following the Supreme Court’s remand, it395
construed the remand order as compelling a reexamination of the admission
of Boeglin’s statement in light of Roberts and the Court’s decision in Lee v.
Illinois,  issued following the reversal in Earnest.   Concluding that396 397
Boeglin’s statement bore sufficient “indicia of reliability” to warrant admission
under Roberts and Lee, it then affirmed the conviction.398
The New Mexico court treated Crawford as not announcing a “new rule”
of constitutional criminal procedure: “Applying the Teague analysis to this
case, we conclude that as to the unique facts and procedural posture of
Earnest’s case, Crawford does not announce a new rule because the result was
‘dictated by precedent existing at the time’ we [initially] decided Earnest I.”  399
Although this approach would later appear to be rejected by the unanimous
Court in Whorton v. Bockting,  in fact, Justice Chávez, writing for the400
majority, carefully limited the analysis in describing the legal landscape at the
time of the initial appellate review of Earnest’s conviction.   At that point in401
time, according to Justice Chavez, Douglas was the controlling rule of law and
had not been overruled in Ohio v. Roberts.   In explaining this conclusion, he402
noted the Crawford Court’s reaffirmation of Douglas: “Of paramount
significance is the United States Supreme Court’s observation that it had
historically excluded accomplice confessions where the defendant had no
opportunity to cross-examine, citing to Douglas, the very case we relied on
when we initially reversed Earnest’s convictions in 1985.”   The New403
Mexico Supreme Court’s retroactive application of Crawford to benefit
Earnest amounted, at least in part, to an affirmation of its reasoning in initially
reversing his conviction.   But it also addressed the issue of fundamental404
fairness in the conduct of the trial of the case, where Earnest and his counsel
395. Id. at 146 (citing Earnest I, 703 P.2d at 876).
396. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
397. State v. Forbes, 119 P.3d at 146.
398. Id. (citing Lee, 476 U.S. 530; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)).
399. Id. at 147 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (plurality opinion)).  In
reaching this conclusion, Justice Chávez reached the same conclusion for the Forbes majority
that Judge Noonan of the Ninth Circuit later relied on in his concurring opinion in Bockting v.
Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 2005) (Noonan, J., concurring), rev’d by Whorton v.
Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007).
400. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406.
401. Forbes, 199 P.3d at 148.
402. Id. at 147.
403. Id. at 147-48 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57 (2004)).
404. Id. at 148 (“In Crawford, therefore, the United States Supreme Court confirmed what
the New Mexico Supreme Court announced in Earnest I—that a custodial statement by an
alleged accomplice to a police officer is not admissible unless the declarant is unavailable and
the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.”).
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tried the case based on the applicability of Douglas v. Alabama, only to find
after the case was appealed the Supreme Court would essentially repudiate
Douglas, by implication, in favor of the “indicia of reliability” analysis it had
adopted in Ohio v. Roberts.  405
While the New Mexico Supreme Court afforded Earnest relief based on its
reading of the confrontation principle affirmed in Crawford, it did not adopt
a general retroactive application approach to Crawford claims in state cases.  406
Instead, it fashioned a ruling based upon limited retroactivity, rather than
formulating a general rule applicable to all Crawford claims.   Arguably, in407
doing so, the court intended that only Earnest among New Mexico litigants
would ever benefit from this ruling.  The court phrased its holding: “Our
decision is limited to the very special facts of this case, highlighted by the fact
that the very law this Court applied to Earnest’s case twenty years ago has now
been vindicated, which entitles him now to the same new trial he should have
received back then.”   In Forbes, the New Mexico court faced two408
compelling considerations in the facts of the case.  First, the court had already
determined that the admission of Boeglin’s confession had been found to be
prejudicial in the original direct appeal.   Second, the court found the fact that409
at the time of Earnest’s trial, Douglas v. Alabama was the controlling Supreme
Court precedent, relied upon by Earnest’s trial counsel and on his direct
appeal.   Only when the Supreme Court vacated the state court’s reversal of410
Earnest’s conviction was that rule governing admission of codefendant
confessions undermined, influenced strongly by then-Justice Rehnquist’s
concurring opinion.   Thus, the rules for trial changed after the fact and411
without any possibility for trial counsel to have advised Earnest and to have
represented him at trial with reasonable knowledge that he could not rely on
Douglas in the preparation of the defense.
Of course, the holding itself left the court the option of extending the benefit
of this approach to any other similarly situated state defendant.  Thus, another
405. Id. at 147-48.
406. Id. at 148-49.
407. Id.
408. Id. (emphasis added).
409. Earnest I, 703 P.2d 872, 876 (N.M. 1985), vacated, New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S.
648 (1986).
410. Id. at 875.
411. See New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648, 649 (1986) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, J.
concurring).  Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justices Powell and O’Connor, 
assessed the impact of Lee on Douglas: “As Lee v. Illinois makes clear, to the extent that
Douglas v. Alabama interpreted the Confrontation Clause as requiring an opportunity for cross-
examination prior to the admission of a codefendant’s out-of-court statement, the case is no
longer good law.”  Id.
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state defendant who would be able to show that counsel had relied on Douglas
v. Alabama at trial in objecting to the admission of a nontestifying
accomplice’s confession never subjected to cross-examination would arguably
be able to claim Forbes as precedent in a state post-conviction action.  But the
court reserved the option of denying reliance on Forbes for trials conducted
after its opinion affirming and following the remand in Earnest.   Once it412
established that it would apply the “indicia of reliability” test for admission of
even uncrossed accomplice statements, it could consistently hold that the
conduct of a subsequent trial was not unfair.  In fact, it appears there may
simply be no defendant other than Earnest himself for whom relief will be ever
be available based on a retroactive application of Crawford.  Thus, the New
Mexico court’s unique holding rested on those peculiar factors in the Earnest
litigation justifying relief as a matter of basic fairness, rather than reflecting a
broader retroactivity doctrine extending the benefit of Crawford to all
previously convicted defendants whose trials included admission of uncrossed
testimonial hearsay. 
The decision in Forbes represents a reasonable alternative for state courts
concerned that new constitutional doctrine undermines the credibility of state
court convictions obtained under now-discarded precedent.  Where the
conviction itself appears to have been undermined by the recognition of a
“new rule” articulated by the Supreme Court, Danforth removes any
constitutional bar to a state court granting relief for those defendants for whom
relief is deemed appropriate.   In fact, given the choice between an absolute413
policy of non-retroactivity or the freedom to fashion retroactivity doctrine that
would require uniform retroactive application of new rules as a matter of state
process, state courts might well prefer the New Mexico approach.  Review of
prior convictions called into question by “new” rules of federal constitutional
criminal procedure and a prejudice or harm assessment of the implication of
the new rule for the underlying conviction itself affords state courts the
freedom “to do justice to each litigant on the merits of his own case.”414
B. A Post-Danforth Framework for Retroactive Application of Crawford
The New Mexico Supreme Court’s disposition of Earnest’s claim for
retroactive application of Crawford reflects the range of creativity for state
courts in fashioning remedies now afforded by Danforth.  In assessing the
scope of any retroactive application of Crawford, for example, the state court
responding to Danforth’s rejection of federal due process limitations on
412. See Forbes, 119 P.3d at 148-49.
413. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1032 (2008).
414. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 259 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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retroactivity might well consider a number of factors in fashioning a doctrine
of limited, or selective, retroactivity.
1. The Nature of the Uncrossed, Hearsay Statement
At the outset, a state court considering retroactive application of the “new
rule” announced in Crawford might first consider the precise scope of claims
fitting within the Supreme Court’s articulation of the cross-examination right. 
Because the Court has expanded the Crawford principle to different types of
statements that are custodial in nature, as in Davis v. Washington,  the danger415
in admission of any of these subsets of statements in terms of potential
prejudice may well vary depending upon the character of the statement itself. 
The unifying theme of Crawford is, after all, the absence of cross-examination
of a witness whose out-of-court statement was made with the reasonable
expectation of its use as evidence in official proceedings.   Thus, the decision416
does not reach to classes of statements not made in this context, such as the
dying declaration, recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule because of
its traditional characterization as reliable or trustworthy.417
Crawford, like Lee v. Illinois, involved admission of a statement
characterized as inherently suspect—the statement of an accomplice to police
that could well be motivated by self-interest of the declarant in shifting blame
to the accused.   Although the Court affirmed the Crawford principle in both418
Bockting and Danforth, the statements under consideration there do not
threaten the integrity of a conviction in so obvious a fashion as the statement
of an accomplice.  Although the statements of children relating incidents of
abuse, as in Bockting and Danforth, may be suspect because they could well
be the product of manipulation or fantasy on the part of a child, those
considerations may not implicate reliability to the extent that the self-
motivated bias of an accomplice suggests.  They have not traditionally been
subject to the same “inherently suspect” characterization used to describe
accomplice statements made to police.   419
Consequently, rather than applying Crawford retroactively across the board
and affording relief to defendants convicted of the entire range of hearsay
415. 547 U.S. 813, 826-27 (2006) (considering admissibility of 911 emergency call
messages).
416. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
417. E.g., Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892).
418. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 65.
419. Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 195 (1987) (White, J., dissenting) (such statements
“have traditionally been viewed with special suspicion”); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541
(1986); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968) (such statements are “inevitably
suspect”).
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admitted improperly in the absence of a meaningful opportunity for cross-
examination, a state court might view its need to afford relief more
restrictively.  Thus, retroactive application might be selective, based primarily
on the nature of the statement in issue.  Of course, this is not to suggest that
only accomplice statements would warrant reconsideration.  Minnesota might
well conclude that statements made by a young child ruled incompetent to
testify due to an inability to differentiate truth from non-truth threatened the
integrity of a conviction precisely because the allegation could be the product
of manipulation or fantasy.  The latitude afforded by Danforth presumably
permits a state court to make exactly this type of determination, formulating
a limited retroactivity rule that would authorize a post-conviction court to
consider the reliability of the conviction in terms of the particular
circumstances surrounding the statement actually admitted at trial.
2. Preservation of Error
A second factor that a state court might consider in determining whether a
full or limited principle of retroactivity should be applied to a “new rule” of
constitutional criminal procedure would be the defendant’s assertion of error
in the trial court.   Typically, a failure to preserve error by timely motion or420
objection will result in a waiver of even a federal constitutional right,  unless421
the jurisdiction authorizes review of the claim as a matter of fundamental or
plain error.   Thus, a state court might only apply a holding retroactively to422
admission of evidence over trial counsel’s timely objection based on the
federal constitutional right compromised.  In terms of Crawford, this would
420. Preservation of constitutional claims, like all claims, is often deemed critical to
appellate review, even when the case may involve a novel issue ultimately considered by the
Supreme Court.  See, e.g., Smith v. Texas, 550 U.S. 297, 300-01, 312-14 (2007) (holding the
petitioner properly preserved his claim based on reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision that
a Texas mitigation instruction was constitutionally insufficient in capital sentencing
proceeding); Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 789 (2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that
in challenging exclusion of forensic evidence of his inability to form required culpable mental
state in prosecution for intentional murder of a police officer Clark had “preserved this issue at
all stages, including in this Court”).
421. See, e.g., State v. Fudge, 206 S.W.3d 850, 858 (Ark. 2005) (alleging ineffective
assistance in capital counsel’s “failure to include federal grounds in his motion for directed
verdict, thereby foreclosing Fudge’s opportunity to present the claim in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding . . . .”).
422. E.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-38 (1993) (explicating federal plain
error rule); State v. Meiers, 412 S.W.2d 478, 480-81 (Mo. 1967); Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129,
133 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (fundamental error of constitutional dimension requires no
objection); Carter v. State, 656 S.W.2d 468, 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (rejecting State’s
argument that appellate court lacks authority to consider unpreserved claims as matters of
fundamental error). 
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simply mean that a defendant whose trial counsel had failed to preserve a Sixth
Amendment confrontation claim through objection to the admission of an
uncrossed hearsay statement would have waived the claim.423
This application of usual preservation rules might appear harsh precisely
because the accused and his trial counsel would essentially be required to
engage in what might be a futile process of objecting to what had been
considered a well-settled constitutional rule.   But, application of424
preservation rules often appears unfair to the accused who suffers from
counsel’s inaction.425
3. Prejudice or Likely Harm from Admission of the Hearsay
Any limited retroactivity rule applied to a Supreme Court decision
announcing a “new rule” of constitutional criminal procedure not made
retroactive based on the Teague exceptions could be fashioned to authorize
relief only in the event the defendant could demonstrate prejudice.  The
423. For instance, even the Court’s retroactivity requirement under Griffith only requires that
lower courts apply the benefits of a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure in those cases
still pending on direct appeal where the claim of error has been preserved.  Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1987).  The Court required retroactive benefit for the new rule for all
“similarly situated” litigants.  Id.  Implicit in Griffith is the requirement that a state court litigant
hoping to avail himself of a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure preserve the
claim in the direct appeal process.  See Trevino v. Texas, 503 U.S. 562, 567 (1992).
424. For a plea for revitalization of the “futility exception,” whereby a litigant is excused
from the requirement to engage in futile efforts at preservation of error without suffering
procedural default, see Newton, supra note 253, at 544-59.
425. A clear example of this is presented in Hinkston v. State, 10 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Ark.
2000), a capital case in which the defendant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
The defense proffered the expert testimony of a forensic clinical psychologist that the
defendant’s mental impairment affected his capacity to form the requisite culpable mental state
for the capital offense charged.  Id. at 909.  This type of evidence is made admissible in ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-2-303 (2006) (“Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or
defect is admissible to prove whether the defendant had the kind of culpable mental state
required for commission of the offense charged.”).  The trial court excluded the evidence. 
Hinkston, 10 S.W.3d at 909.  On direct appeal, the defendant argued that the exclusion of the
expert testimony violated his right to present a defense under the Sixth Amendment.  Because
trial counsel had not asserted the Sixth Amendment claim as a basis for admission of the expert
opinion, however, the Arkansas Supreme Court refused to consider the argument based on the
federal constitutional right to compulsory process.  Id.  Thus, even federal constitutional claims
resting on established principles of constitutional law, as articulated in the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, may be treated as waived as a result of trial counsel’s failure to
preserve error.  The Hinkston court tersely concluded: “We do not consider arguments, even
constitutional ones, raised for the first time on appeal.”  Id.  The court then addressed the
defendant’s nonconstitutional evidentiary argument which was raised below and, thus,
preserved for appellate review.  Id.  The court held that exclusion of the expert opinion did not
constitute an abuse of discretion under the Arkansas evidence rules.  Id.
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significance of tying relief through retroactive application to proof of prejudice
lies in the fact that a state’s retroactivity determination would be designed to
afford relief only to those claims that actually implicate the integrity of the
conviction or sentence.  When a state appellate court reviews a federal
constitutional claim on direct appeal, it must apply the harmlessness standard
of Chapman v. California.   Under Chapman, the burden is placed on the426
prosecution to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that constitutional trial
error was harmless in order to avoid reversal.   This burden, imposed on the427
prosecution, is heavy by design and serves to promote compliance with
constitutional protections afforded the accused in the criminal process.
However, as discussed previously, in Brecht v. Abrahamson, the Court
recognized that competing interests, including finality,  warrant application428
of a different standard for proof of harm in evaluating claims of constitutional
error asserted in federal habeas proceedings.   But when that same error is429
recognized by the federal habeas court, the petitioner is not entitled to relief
unless the petitioner can also establish that the error affected the course of the
proceedings.   The standard adopted in Brecht mirrors that applied to non-430
constitutional errors reviewed in appeals in federal cases.   This test, the431
Kotteakos standard, “under which an error requires reversal only if it ‘had
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s
verdict,’”  essentially shifts the burden to the federal habeas petitioner to432
demonstrate prejudice resulting from the constitutional error.  Finally, when
the federal habeas court is in “grave doubt” as to whether the prejudice
standard has been met, the petitioner benefits from the unresolved question and
is entitled to relief.433
State courts may determine that the Brecht standard should apply to claims
of federal constitutional error in state post-conviction process.   For instance,434
426. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
427. Id.
428. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633-35 (1993).  The majority observed: “The
reason most frequently advanced in our cases for distinguishing between direct and collateral
review is the State’s interest in the finality of convictions that have survived direct review
within the state court system.”  Id. at 635.
429. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (affording state court defendants the federal
habeas corpus remedy in challenging their convictions based on federal constitutional error in
their state prosecutions when state courts rejected their constitutional claims based on wholly
contrary or unreasonable interpretations of Supreme Court precedent).
430. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638-39.
431. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946).
432. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776).
433. O’Neal v. McAinich, 513 U.S. 432, 445 (1995).
434. Ex parte Fierro, 934 S.W.2d 370, 371-72 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
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the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals expressly relied on Brecht in explaining
its approach to a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in Ex parte Fierro where
the claim related to the use of perjured testimony at a suppression hearing.  435
The Texas court explained that, generally, federal constitutional claims, except
knowing use of perjury, are reviewed for prejudice under a test requiring the
defendant to prove prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence.   An436
allegation of knowing use triggers review under the rule applicable on direct
appeal, which requires reversal unless the court concludes that the “error made
no contribution to the conviction or punishment.”   Because the petitioner437
could not demonstrate that the prosecutor knowingly used false testimony, his
claim was evaluated under the test requiring him to carry the burden of
demonstrating prejudice, and the error was deemed harmless.438
The different treatment of constitutional claims in the state post-conviction
process by the Texas court in Fierro suggests that state courts considering
retroactive application of new rules might justifiably impose a duty on the
petitioner claiming their benefit to demonstrate prejudice or probable prejudice
resulting from the error.   But the Fierro Court discussed one additional439
consideration that might factor into a retroactivity determination.   The Court440
concluded that the claim under consideration was one properly characterized
as trial error, rather than structural error because the post-conviction applicant
could not demonstrate that the prosecutor knowingly used perjury.   This441
distinction was critical to the court’s application of its prejudice standard
because, as it explained,  structural error is not subject to harmlessness442
analysis, based on the Supreme Court’s descriptions of structural and trial error
435. Id. at 372.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 372 n.4 (citing TEX. R. APP. PROC. 81(b)(2)).
438. Id. at 374-75.
439. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Fierro v. Texas, 521 U.S. 1122 (1997). 
Although the denial of certiorari does not have precedential value, see Carpenter v. Gomez, 516
U.S. 981, 981 (1995) (Stevens, J., opinion respecting denial of petition for writ of certiorari),
the denial of certiorari in Fierro nevertheless might serve to inform state courts considering
similar issues.  In 1991, for instance, the Court had suggested that South Carolina used an
erroneous standard in assessing prejudice arguably resulting from a constitutionally-flawed jury
instruction in a case litigated in the state post-conviction process.  Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391,
400 (1991).  Yates was soon discredited in Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4 (1991), and
the correction was apparently addressed to the actual consideration of the effect of the
instruction, rather than the general test applied for review of constitutional error addressed in
the state post-conviction process.  
440. Fierro, 934 S.W.2d at 374.
441. Id. (citing Arizona v. Fuliamente, 499 U.S. 279, 307-12 (1991); see supra note 255
(discussing structural and trial error under Fulminante).
442. Fierro, 934 S.W.2d at 372-74.
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in Arizona v. Fulminante.   Thus, under the Texas approach, a postconviction443
petitioner claiming relief based on constitutional trial error  would be444
required to demonstrate that the error contributed to the conviction or
punishment.
The unresolved question for Danforth analysis might be whether a state
court should approach the issue of retroactive application of a structural error
claim arising in the context of a “new rule.”  For instance, the Danforth Court
noted that Pennsylvania had applied Batson retroactively.   Batson’s rule,445
prohibiting discriminatory exclusion of ethnic minorities from jury service
through exercise of peremptory challenges, involves imposition of a
prophylactic rule designed to address a problem of “structural error,” as the
Court noted in Fulminante.   The Court refused to direct federal habeas446
courts to apply the “new rule” retroactively in federal habeas litigation brought
by state inmates.447
Arguably, a state court might fashion a relatively reasonable prejudice
requirement for even some structural claims, such as that implicated by
Batson.  For instance, the court could direct that relief be granted on
retroactive consideration of a Batson violation only upon a showing of some
likelihood of prejudice.  A likelihood of prejudice might then be demonstrated
by a showing that the case involved some question of ethnic or gender-based
prejudice such that discriminatory exclusion of a prospective juror could
443. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 307-09.
444. The Fulminante Court described “trial” error as error which occurs during the
presentation of evidence at trial and may “be quantitatively assessed in the context of other
evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 307-08.  It also provided a number of examples of “structural” error:
“total deprivation of counsel at trial, a biased judge, the unlawful exclusion of members of the
defendant’s race from a grand jury, denial of the right to self-representation at trial, and denial
of the right to a public trial.”  Fierro, 934 S.W.2d at 372 (citing Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310).
445. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1043 (2008) (citing Commonwealth v.
McCormick, 519 A.2d 442, 448 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)).  However, the state court’s decision is
limited because the issue arose in the context of direct appeal, rather than in collateral review. 
McCormick, 519 A.2d at 446.  McCormick was decided a year prior to Griffith, where the
Supreme Court held that “new rules” decisions apply to non-final cases on direct appeal when
the decision is announced.  Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987).  Thus, although the
McCormick Court clearly held that Pennsylvania was not bound by federal retroactivity
principles, the conclusion in the decision was consistent with the retroactivity policy
subsequently adopted as the federal due process rule in Griffith.  The state court engaged in
extensive discussion of state autonomy in retroactivity decisions and discussion of
Pennsylvania’s history of making retroactivity determinations advancing its position on state
court autonomy.  McCormick, 519 A.2d at 445-50.
446. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 291. 
447. Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 261 (1986).
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logically have influenced the verdict or sentence imposed.  If one or more
minority jurors were excluded through discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges, for example, the likely, probable, or potential prejudice threshold
might be demonstrated if the case involved an issue of a cross-racial crime or
identification, or an issue of race-bias motivation for the offense.  
The mere imposition of a prejudice formula, however, is not likely to apply
fairly to all structural errors, even theoretically.   For example, exclusion of448
a Witherspoon-qualified juror from a capital trial might not be subject to any
prejudice analysis without resort to speculation if a death sentence was, in fact,
imposed.  But if jurors imposed a life sentence and the evidence supporting
conviction was legally sufficient, the error in excluding the juror could be
characterized as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, thus meeting even the
rigorous standard of Chapman.   449
Similarly, while some questions of constitutionally-flawed jury instructions
present questions of structural error,  such as an instruction that improperly450
mischaracterizes the burden of proof or denial of an instruction on a defensive
theory raised by the evidence,  other omissions are not necessarily beyond451
harm analysis.452
Finally, and most importantly with respect to the Crawford issue, the
harmlessness/prejudice determination applicable in confrontation cases
actually requires a showing of probable prejudice in a related context.   When453
a Sixth Amendment confrontation claim is based on a trial court’s limitation
on cross-examination, rather than when the defendant is wholly deprived of an
448. The Supreme Court recognized the “structural/trial error” distinction in California v.
Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5 (1996), holding that the Kotteakos test imposed for claims of constitutional
error recognized in the federal habeas process announced in Brecht is appropriate for review of
trial error claims, but not claims of structural error.
449. Chapman v. California, 368 U.S. 18 (1967).
450. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1993).
451. See, e.g., Teater v. State, 201 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005) (trial court’s
refusal to instruct on insanity defense supported by evidence constituted structural error
requiring reversal); Teater v. State, No. CACR 06-936, 2007 WL 987814, at *3-4 (Ark. Ct.
App. Apr. 4, 2007) (trial court’s refusal to instruct on insanity at retrial following remand
required reversal; law of the case doctrine dictated instruction where expert testimony offered
at retrial substantially conformed to opinion at initial trial determined to warrant instruction on
defense).
452. Concurring in Roy, 519 U.S. at 6, Justice Scalia explained that the harmlessness test,
as applied where the issue raises a jury instruction flawed by omission of a necessary element
of the offense, should be phrased in terms of the following inquiry: “The error in the present
case can be harmless only if the jury verdict on other points effectively embraces this one or if
it is impossible, upon the evidence, to have found what the verdict did find without finding this
point as well.”  Id. at 7.
453. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 674 (1986).
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opportunity for meaningful cross-examination, a finding of constitutional error
rests on a showing of probable prejudice.   In Delaware v. Van Arsdall, the454
Court held that a limitation on cross requires reversal only when the
defendant’s right to test the evidence was compromised by the limitation.  455
Rather, the Van Arsdall Court applied a test that begins with the assumption
that the cross-examination not permitted by the trial court would have
achieved its intended purpose, or in other words, it would have been
successful.   Starting from this perspective, the assumed successful cross-456
examination is measured against the same types of factors that would be relied
on by reviewing courts in assessing any claim of trial error:  the importance of
the witness’s testimony to the prosecution’s case; whether the evidence offered
by the witness was cumulative; whether the witness’s testimony was
corroborated or contradicted by other evidence on key points; the extent of
cross-examination actually permitted by the trial court; and the overall strength
of the prosecution’s case.   Thus, the reviewing court can determine if the457
denial or limitation on the defendant’s cross-examination was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.  
In dissent, Justice Marshall noted the majority’s conclusion that a complete
denial of cross-examination would demonstrate a Confrontation Clause-
required reversal.   On direct appeal, his observation, when applied to458
admission of testimonial hearsay in the absence of a meaningful opportunity
for cross-examination, is consistent with the holding in Crawford.  But, in the
context of a state court’s decision to afford retroactive application to
Crawford, the application of the Van Arsdall formula might prove reasonable
in determining which claimants should be afforded relief to prevent the
miscarriage of justice flowing from a conviction obtained in violation of the
Sixth Amendment confrontation guarantee.
Conclusions
The decision in Danforth recognizes the autonomy of state courts in
developing and implementing retroactivity doctrine, particularly when applied
to the possible reliance by state court defendants on new rules of constitutional
criminal procedure recognized by the Court, but not held to apply retroactively
under Teague.  This autonomy affirms the significant role of state courts
within the federal system in the development of law operating within a
454. Id. at 680.
455. Id. at 683-84.
456. Id. at 684.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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particular jurisdiction, while recognizing the supremacy of the United States
Supreme Court in interpreting the Federal Constitution.  
Moreover, the pre-Danforth decision by the New Mexico Supreme Court
in State v. Forbes demonstrates how the flexibility ultimately afforded by
Danforth might be exercised in state court proceedings in which individual
considerations of fundamental fairness might result in limited retroactive
applications of federal constitutional precedent, while other considerations
would militate against broader retroactive application.  Danforth arose in the
context of a particularly troubling constitutional question regarding the
admissibility of certain classes of hearsay without the opportunity for the
defense to meaningfully cross-examine the declarant.  
Yet, the factual context of Danforth is particularly important when
compared to Crawford.  In Crawford, as in the Earnest case in New Mexico
in which retroactive relief was afforded for the convicted defendant, the
declarant was an accomplice and his statement to the police implicating others
fell within that class of testimony traditionally considered “inherently suspect.” 
The declarant in Danforth, in contrast, was a child deemed incompetent to
testify in court, but whose statement did not suggest any likelihood of motive
or bias to report falsely.  Consequently, any state court considering the issue
of retroactive application of Crawford, might well look to discrete factors in
assessing whether admission of the uncrossed hearsay likely prejudiced the
accused or contributed to his conviction.  Danforth permits a state court
making a retroactivity determination—particularly on a Crawford issue—to
consider the likelihood of unfairness to the accused.  State courts may apply
federal constitutional decisions retroactively, but creatively, by limiting the
scope of retroactivity.  In that sense, Danforth implicitly respects not only the
autonomy of state courts within the federal system, but their sensitivity to
basic issues of justice in the administration of the criminal law.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss3/1
